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FOREWORD
North Korea’s foreign relations are a blend of contradiction and complexity. They start from the incongruity between Pyongyang’s highly touted policy of
juche, or self-reliance, and North Korea’s extended and
heavy reliance on foreign aid and assistance over the
6 decades of its existence. This aid—both military and
economic—in the first 4 decades came from China, the
Soviet Union, and communist bloc states; in the past
2 decades, this aid has come from countries including
China, South Korea, and the United States.
In this monograph, Dr. Samuel Kim examines
North Korea’s foreign relations with China, Russia,
Japan, the United States, and South Korea during the
post-Cold War era. He argues that central to understanding North Korea’s international behavior in the
21st century is the extent to which the policies of the
United States have shaped that behavior. Although
some readers may not agree with all of Dr. Kim’s interpretations and assessments, they nevertheless will find
his analysis simulating and extremely informative.
This publication is the fifth in a series titled “Demystifying North Korea,” the products of a project directed
by Dr. Andrew Scobell. The first monograph, North Korea’s Strategic Intentions, written Dr. Scobell, was published in July 2005. The second monograph, Kim Jong
Il and North Korea: The Leader and the System, also written by Dr. Scobell, appeared in March 2006. The third
monograph, North Korean Civil-Military Trends: Military-First Politics to a Point, written by Mr. Ken Gause,
appeared in October 2006. The fourth monograph,
North Korea’s Military Conventional and Unconventional
Military Capabilities and Intentions (forthcoming March
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2007), was written by Captain John Sanford (USN) and
Dr. Scobell. Future monographs will examine North
Korea’s economy and assess future scenarios. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to make this monograph publicly available.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Any attempt to understand North Korean foreign
relations in the post–Cold War world is to be confronted with a genuine puzzle of both real-world and theoretical significance. On the one hand, in the post–Cold
War era North Korea—officially known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)—has been
seen by many as a failed state on the verge of explosion
or implosion. On the other hand, not only has North
Korea survived, despite a rapid succession of external
shocks—the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, the end of
both the Cold War and superpower rivalry, and the
demise of the Soviet Union—all on top of a series of
seemingly fatal internal woes, including spreading
famine, deepening socialist alienation, and the death
of its founder, the “eternal president” Kim Il Sung. But
with its nuclear and missile brinkmanship diplomacy,
it has become a focus of regional and global prime-time
coverage.
Paradoxically, Pyongyang seems to have turned its
weakness into strength by playing its “collapse card,”
driving home the point that it is anything but a Fourth
World banana republic that would disappear quietly
without a big fight or a huge mess, a mess that no outside neighboring power would be willing or able to
clean up. In fact, not only has North Korea, the weakest of the six main actors in the region, continued to
exist, but it has also catapulted itself to the position of
primary driver of Northeast Asian geopolitics through
its strategic use of nuclear brinkmanship diplomacy.
From this transformed geopolitical landscape emerges
the greatest irony of the region: today, in the post–Cold
War world, North Korea seems to have a more secure
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sovereignty itself, while posing greater security risks
to its neighbors, than has ever been the case in recent
history.
The starting premise of this monograph is that for
all the uniqueness of the regime and its putative political autonomy, post–Kim Il Sung North Korea has been
subject to the same external pressures and dynamics
that are inherent in an increasingly interdependent and
interactive world. The foreign relations that define the
place of North Korea in the international community
today are the result of the trajectories that Pyongyang
has chosen to take—or was forced to take—given its
national interests and politics. In addition, the choices
of the North Korean state are constrained by the international environment in which they interact, given its
location at the center of Northeast Asian geopolitics in
which the interests of the Big Four (China, Russia, Japan, and the United States) inevitably compete, clash,
mesh, coincide, etc., as those nations pursue their course
in the region. North Korea per se is seldom of great importance to any of the Big Four, but its significance is
closely tied to and shaped by the overall foreign policy
goals of each of the Big Four Plus One (South Korea).
Thus North Korea is seen merely as part of the problem or part of the solution for Northeast Asia.
On the basis of historical and comparative analysis
of the conduct of North Korean foreign policy, especially the turbulent relations with the Big Four plus the
relationship with South Korea, the main objective here
is to track, explain, and assess North Korea’s foreign
policy behavior in the post–Cold War and post–Kim Il
Sung era, using a behavior-centered approach. What
is most striking about post–Cold War North Korean
foreign policy is not the centrality of the Big Four but
rather the extent to which the United States has figured
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in the major changes and shifts in Pyongyang’s international behavior. North Korea has sought and found
a new troika of life-supporting geopolitical patrons in
China, South Korea, and Russia, and also a new pair
of life-supporting geo-economic patrons in China and
South Korea, even as America’s dominant perception
of North Korea has shifted significantly from that of a
poor nation in need of a life-support system to that of
an aggressive nation representing a mortal threat. As if
in fear of the DPRK’s “tyranny of proximity,” however,
all three of North Korea’s contiguous neighbors—China, Russia, and South Korea—have tended to be reluctant to support Washington’s hard-line strategy.
Although the future of North Korea is never clear,
the way the outside world—especially the Big Four
plus Seoul—responds to Pyongyang is closely keyed
to the way North Korea responds to the outside world.
North Korea’s future is malleable rather than rigidly
predetermined. This nondeterministic image of the future of the post–Kim Il Sung system opens up room for
the outside world to use whatever leverage it might
have to nudge North Korean leaders toward opting for
a particular future scenario over another less benign in
the coming years.

viii

NORTH KOREAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
IN THE POST–COLD WAR WORLD
INTRODUCTION
To understand North Korean foreign relations in
the post–Cold War world is to be confronted with a
genuine puzzle of both real-world . On the one hand,
in the post–Cold War era North Korea—officially
known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK)—has been seen by many as a failed state on the
verge of explosion or implosion. This dire assessment
stems from the troublesome fact that the country has
encountered a rapid succession of external shocks—the
crumbling of the Berlin Wall, the end of both the Cold
War and superpower rivalry, the demise of the Soviet
Union and international communism, Moscow-Seoul
normalization, and Beijing-Seoul normalization—on
top of a series of internal woes, including the death
of its founder, the “eternal president” Kim Il Sung, a
downward spiral of industrial output, food/energy/
hard currency shortages, shrinking trade, and deepening systemic dissonance, with the resulting famine
killing at least 3–5 percent of the population in the
latter half of the 1990s.
Thus for the first time since the Korean War, the
question of the future of North Korea—whether it
will survive or collapse, slowly or suddenly—has
prompted a flurry of debates and has provoked many
on-the-fly pundits and soothsayers of one kind or
another in the United States. Many of these predicted
that in the wake of Kim Il Sung’s death, the DPRK
would collapse within 6 months; or that in less than 3
years, Korea would have a German-style reunification
by absorption.


The popularity of this “collapsist” scenario also
has been evident in the policy communities of some of
the neighboring states. In 1994 and 1995, for example,
South Korean President Kim Young Sam jumped on the
collapsist bandwagon when he depicted North Korea
as a “broken airplane” headed for a crash landing that
would be followed by a quick Korean reunification.
The specter of collapse has even prompted behindthe-scenes efforts by the U.S. Department of Defense
(DoD) to coordinate contingency planning with South
Korean and Japanese allies. At a summit meeting held
on Cheju Island in April 1996, leaders of South Korea
and the United States jointly agreed to promote a twoplus-two formula, the Four-Party Peace Talks, even as
they privately predicted that the collapse in the North
could come as soon as 2 or 3 years.1 Such endgame
speculation on the future of post–Kim Il Sung North
Korea has become a favorite diplomatic sport.2
At the turn of the new millennium, which many
predicted North Korea would not survive to see, not
only does the socialist “hermit kingdom” still exist, but
with its nuclear and missile brinkmanship diplomacy,
it has become a focus of regional and global primetime coverage. The new consensus in South Korean
and American intelligence communities in early 2000
was that North Korea would survive at least until
2015.3 Paradoxically, Pyongyang seems to have turned
its weakness into strength by playing its “collapse
card,” driving home that it is anything but a Fourth
World banana republic that would disappear quietly
without a big fight or a huge mess, a mess that no
outside neighboring power would be willing or able
to clean up. In addition, North Korea has catapulted
itself into the position of a primary driver of Northeast
Asian geopolitics through its nuclear diplomacy. Thus



emerges the greatest irony of the region: today, in the
post–Cold War world, North Korea seems both to enjoy
a more secure sovereignty and pose greater security
risks to its neighbors than has ever been the case in
recent history.
The premise of this monograph is that for all
its uniqueness as a state and its putative political
autonomy, post–Kim Il Sung North Korea has been
subject to the same external pressures and dynamics
that are inherent in an increasingly interdependent and
interactive world. The foreign relations that define the
place of North Korea in the international community
today are the result of trajectories that Pyongyang has
chosen to take—or was forced to take—given its national
interests and politics. In addition, the choices of the
North Korean state are constrained by the international
environment in which they interact, given its location
at the center of Northeast Asian (NEA) geopolitics in
which the interests of the Big Four inevitably compete,
clash, mesh, etc., with each other in various issue areas
as these nations pursue their self-determined courses
in the region. North Korea, per se, is seldom of great
importance to any of the Big Four. Its importance is
closely keyed to and shaped by the overall foreign
policy goals of each of the Big Four. North Korea is
thus seen merely as part of the problem or part of the
solution for Northeast Asia.
Rather than examining North Korean foreign
relations strictly in the material terms of strategic
state interests, balance of power, nuclear arsenals,
and conventional force capabilities, it is important to
question how instances of conflict and cooperation
might be redefined in terms of conflicting and
commensurable identities. Traditional realist national
security approaches cannot escape the reactive (and



self-fulfilling) consequences of a state’s security
behavior for the behavior of its adversary. The issue
of North Korea’s nuclear program can never be settled
without addressing the country’s legitimate security
needs and fears in strategically credible ways.4 This is
not to say, however, that force ratios and trade levels
do not matter, but rather that the contours of North
Korean foreign relations are shaped by far more
fundamental considerations.
This monograph consists of four sections. The first
depicts in broad strokes sui generis regional (“near
abroad”) characteristics for a contextual analysis
of North Korean foreign relations in the post–Cold
War era. The second examines the complex interplay
of global, regional, and national forces that have
influenced and shaped the changing relational patterns
between North Korea and the Big Four Plus One. The
third assesses Pyongyang’s survival strategy in both
the security and economic domains. Finally, the fourth
briefly addresses the future prospects of North Korea’s
relations with the Big Four Plus One.
THE “NEAR ABROAD” ENVIRONMENT,
OLD AND NEW
In these early years of the new millennium, there is
something both very old and very new in the regional
security complex surrounding the Korean peninsula.
What remains unchanged and unchangeable is
the geographical location of North Korea, which is
tightly surrounded and squeezed by no less than five
countries—the Big Four and the southern rival, South
Korea (the “Big Four plus One”). As Jules Cambon
wrote in 1935, “The geographical position of a nation
is the principal factor conditioning its foreign policy—



the principal reason why it must have a foreign policy
at all.”5
Of course, geography matters in the shaping of
any state’s foreign policy, but this is especially true for
the foreign policies of the two Koreas and their three
neighboring powers. A glance at the map and a whiff
of the geopolitical smoke from the latest (second) U.S.–
DPRK nuclear standoff suggest why Northest Asia
(NEA) is one of the most important yet most volatile
regions of the world. When it comes to the dream of a
Eurasian “Iron Silk Road,” North Korea’s hub position
makes China, Russia, South Korea, and even Japan more
receptive to upgrading its dilapidated transportation
infrastructure. It is hardly surprising, then, that each of
the Big Four has come to regard the Korean peninsula as
the strategic pivot point of NEA security and therefore
as falling within its own geostrategic ambit.6 Indeed,
North Korea’s unique place in the geopolitics of NEA
remains at once a blessing, a curse, and a Rorschach
test.
The world’s heaviest concentration of military and
economic capabilities lies in this region: the world’s
three largest nuclear weapon states (the United States,
Russia, and China), one nuclear ambiguous state
(North Korea), three threshold nuclear weapon states
(Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan), the world’s three
largest economies on a purchasing power parity basis
(the United States, China, and Japan),7 and East Asia’s
three largest economies (Japan, China, and South
Korea). It was in NEA that the Cold War turned into a
hot war, and the region, lacking any nonaligned states,
was more involved in Cold War politics than any other
region or subregion. Even with the end of the Cold War
and superpower rivalry, the region is still distinguished
by continuing, if somewhat anachronistic, Cold War



alliance systems linking the two Koreas, Japan, China,
and the United States in a bilateralized regional security
complex.
NEA is more than a geographical entity. Although
geographical proximity is important, defining East Asia
or especially NEA in these terms alone is problematic
because any strictly geographical approach would
obscure rather than reveal the critical role of the United
States in Northeast Asian international relations.8 NEA
is considered to be vitally important to America’s
security and economic interests, and the U.S. role
remains a crucial factor (perhaps the most crucial) in
the regional geostrategic and geo-economic equations.
The United States, by dint of its deep interest and
involvement in Northeast Asian geopolitics and geoeconomics, deploys some 100,000 troops in the AsiaPacific region, concentrated mostly in Japan and South
Korea.9
As this might suggest, the divide in NEA between
regional and global politics is blurred substantially,
if not completely erased, for several reasons. First,
the region is the “strategic home” of three of the five
permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC), which are also three of the five
original nuclear weapon states shielded by the twotiered, discriminatory Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
regime. Second, Japan, Greater China, and South Korea
alone accounted for about 25 percent of the world gross
domestic product (GDP) in 2000. As of mid-2005, NEA
is home to the world’s four largest holders of foreign
exchange reserves: Japan ($825.0 billion), China ($711.0
billion), Taiwan ($253.6 billion), and South Korea ($205.7
billion).10 In addition, Japan remains the world’s second
largest financial contributor to the United Nations
(UN) and its associated specialized agencies. Finally,



the rapid rise of China’s economic power and related
military power has given rise to many debates among
specialists and policymakers over how much influence
Beijing actually exerts in NEA and what this means for
U.S. interests as well as an emerging Northeast Asian
order.11
The structural impact of power transition and
globalization seems to have accentuated the
uncertainties and complexities of great power politics
in the region. The centripetal forces of increasing
economic interaction and interdependence are
straining against the centrifugal forces tending toward
protection of national identity and sovereignty, not
to mention the widely differing notions of conflict
management in NEA. In the absence of superpower
conflict, the foreign policies of the two Koreas and the
Big Four are subject to competing pressures, especially
the twin pressures of globalization from above and
localization from below. All are experiencing wrenching national identity difficulties in adjusting to post–
Cold War realignments, and all are in flux regarding
their national identities and how these relate to the
region as a whole.
Thus policymakers in Pyongyang—no less than
scholars and policymakers elsewhere—are challenged
by a unique and complex cocktail of regional
characteristics: high capability, abiding animus, deep
albeit differentiated entanglement of the Big Four in
Korean affairs, North Korea’s recent emergence as
a nuclear loose cannon, the absence of multilateral
security institutions, the rise of America’s unilateral
triumphalism, growing economic integration and
regionalization, and the resulting uncertainties and
unpredictability in the international politics of NEA.
Regional cooperation to alleviate the security dilemma



or to establish a viable security community is not
impossible, but it is more difficult to accomplish when
the major regional actors are working under the long
shadows of historical enmities and contested political
identities.
NORTH KOREA AND THE BIG FOUR PLUS ONE
China and North Korea.
Without a doubt, China holds greater importance in
North Korea’s foreign policy than the DPRK holds in
Chinese foreign policy. China’s potential trump cards
in Korean affairs are legion, including demographic
weight as the world’s most populous country,
territorial size and contiguity, military power as the
world’s third-largest nuclear weapons state after the
United States and Russia, veto power in the UNSC, new
market power as the world’s fastest growing economy,
and the traditional Confucian cultural influence with
strong historical roots.
Moreover, in describing relations between the
People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) and the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the term
“bilateral” is somewhat of a misnomer. Since the end
of the Cold War and the demise of global socialist
ideology, Sino-North Korean relations have developed
with a constant eye toward both South Korea (ROK or
Republic of Korea) and the United States. While the
relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang remains
a special one, its unique characteristics are now defined
by China’s use of its connections with the DPRK for the
maintenance of domestic and “near abroad” stability
rather than for any grander ambitions.
Political and Diplomatic Interaction. During the Cold
War, North Korea’s geostrategic importance and its


proximity to China and the Soviet Union made it easier
for Pyongyang to cope with the twin abandonment/
entrapment security dilemmas. With the rise of the
Sino–Soviet dispute in the late 1950s and the eruption
of open conflict in the 1960s, Kim Il Sung made a virtue
of necessity by manipulating his country’s strategic
relations with Moscow and Beijing in a self-serving
manner. He took sides when necessary on particular
issues, always attempting to extract maximum payoffs
in economic, technical, and military aid, but never
completely casting his lot with one over the other.
In the 1980s, however, the PRC and DPRK were on
separate and less entangled trajectories. If the central
challenge of post-Mao Chinese foreign policy was
how to make the world congenial for its resurgent
modernization drive via reform and opening to
the capitalist world system, then Pyongyang’s top
priority, at least in the 1980s, was to contain, isolate,
and destabilize South Korea in the seemingly endless
pursuit of absolute one-nation legitimation and Korean
reunification on its own terms. The 1983 Rangoon
bombing (in which 17 members of South Korean
President Chun Doo Hwan’s delegation were killed)
and the 1987 mid-air sabotage of a Korean Air jetliner
(which claimed the lives of all 115 people aboard)
brought into sharp relief the vicious circle of the politics
of competitive legitimation and delegitimation on the
Korean peninsula.
During the long Deng decade, Beijing’s Korea policy
evolved through several phases—from the familiar
one-Korea (pro-Pyongyang) policy, to a one-Korea
de jure/two-Koreas de facto policy, and finally to a
policy of two Koreas de facto and de jure. The decision
to normalize relations with South Korea, finalized in
August 1992, was the culmination of a gradual process



of balancing and adjusting post-Mao foreign policy to
the logic of changing domestic, regional, and global
situations.12 The Sino–ROK normalization was made
possible by the mutual acceptance of differences in
political identity following China’s long-standing
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and Seoul’s
Nordpolitik, which called for the improvement of interKorean relations as well as South Korea’s relations with
socialist countries in conformity with the principles of
equality, respect, and mutual prosperity, irrespective of
political and ideological differences. Ironically, but not
surprisingly, the greater challenge has been to China
and the DPRK in adjusting their socialist identities in
the post–Cold War (and post-Socialist) world.
Perhaps because of the lack of change in Pyongyang’s international course, Beijing did not pursue a
truly active geostrategic engagement as part of its approach to the Korean peninsula after the normalization of relations with the ROK. Instead, it more or
less followed Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy axiom of
“hiding its light under a bushel,” not placing itself on
the front lines of the Korean conflict. While the 1992
two-Koreas decision was arguably the most significant
reorientation of post–Cold War Chinese foreign policy
in the Northeast Asian region, it did not signal a greater
Chinese conflict management role in regional or global
politics. China’s hands-off approach was demonstrated
particularly in the 1993–94 U.S.-DPRK nuclear standoff,
when Beijing played neither mediator nor peacemaker
for fear it might get burned if something went wrong.
The Chinese repeated the familiar refrain that “the
issue was a direct matter between the DPRK and the
three sides—the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), the United States, and the Republic of Korea.”13
This “who me?” posture reflected a cost-benefit
calculus intended to keep the PRC out of harm’s way
10

while still holding both Pyongyang and Seoul within
its Sinocentric circle of influence in East Asia. Even
after Pyongyang’s alleged confession of the existence
of a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program, China
persisted in its risk-averse posture toward the nuclear
issue on the Korean peninsula.
Security Interaction. All of this changed, and changed
dramatically, in the heat of the second U.S.-DPRK nuclear confrontation in early 2003. China suddenly
launched an unprecedented flurry of mediation
diplomacy. While the idea of a nuclear-free Korean
peninsula is important, for the Chinese leadership and
most Chinese strategic analysts, the survival of the
North Korean regime and the reform of North Korea
are China’s greatest challenge and prime objective,
respectively.14 Growing fears of the potential for
reckless action by the United States and North Korea
as they engage in mutual provocation—which could
trigger another war in China’s strategic backyard—
have served as the most decisive proximate catalyst for
Beijing’s hands-on conflict management diplomacy.
There were other catalysts for the shift, including
China’s own enhanced geopolitical and economic
leverage, the steady rise of regional and global
multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy thinking and
behavior, and the creeping unilateralism under the
Clinton administration that expanded under the Bush
administration. In short, the unique confluence of both
proximate and underlying factors—greater danger,
greater stakes, and greater leverage—explains why
Beijing was spurred into action in early 2003.
With its conflict management resources, both diplomatic and economic, China has clearly made a heavy
investment in prompting the Six-Party process toward
a negotiated solution or at the very least in averting its
collapse. From the beginning, China’s mediation-cum11

conflict management diplomacy required shuttle/
visitation diplomacy—and aid diplomacy—to bring
the DPRK to a negotiating table in Beijing. From early
2003 to late 2005, senior Chinese officials have stepped
up shuttle/visitation diplomacy on a quarterly basis.
Moreover, these visits have been conducted at levels
senior enough to require meetings with Chairman
Kim Jong Il, serving notice to Washington that direct
interaction with the Chairman is the shortest way
toward progress in the Six-Party process. The Chinese
are reported to have made an exceptional effort in the
fourth round of talks—the most important and extended
round to date—mobilizing a professional work team of
about 200 experts from nine departments or bureaus
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These diplomats
all spent day and night working on successive drafts
of a joint statement of principles, pulling together the
lowest common denominator among views laid out by
the six parties in the behind-the-scenes negotiations,
which included an unprecedented half-dozen bilateral
meetings between U.S. and North Korean diplomats.15
Caught in diplomatic gridlock and against the
backdrop of being labeled an “outpost of tyranny”
by the second-term Bush administration, Pyongyang
raised the ante of its brinkmanship with a statement
on February 10, 2005, that it had “manufactured nukes
for self-defense to cope with the Bush administration’s
evermore undisguised policy to isolate and stifle the
DPRK” and that it was therefore “compelled to suspend
participation in the [Six Party] talks for an indefinite
period.”16
Pyongyang’s decision to rejoin the Six Party talks
after a 13-month hiatus can be partially attributed to
the synergy of Chinese and South Korean mediation
diplomacy aimed at providing a face-saving exit
from the trap of mutual U.S.-DPRK creation. This
12

was particularly important in the wake of the Bush
administration’s characterization of Kim Jong Il as a
“tyrant” and U.S. Secretary of Defense Condoleezza
Rice’s labeling of North Korea as an “outpost of
tyranny.” Beijing, Seoul, and Moscow have been
prodding the Bush administration to stop using this
kind of language and to map out detailed economic
and security incentives as quid pro quo for North
Korea’s nuclear disarmament. The implicit withdrawal
of vilifying rhetoric was quite important in Pyongyang,
as made evident in an official statement of the DPRK
Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
. . . the U.S. side at the contact made between the heads
of both delegations in Beijing Saturday clarified that it
would recognize the DPRK as a sovereign state, not to
invade it, and hold bilateral talks within the framework
of the Six Party talks, and the DPRK side interpreted it
as a retraction of its remark designating the former as
an “outpost of tyranny” and decided to return to the Six
Party talks.17

The “words for words” and “action for action”
approach that North Korea assumed as its negotiating
stance and that China inferred as group consensus in
the Chairman’s statement at the end of the third round
of talks, also provided an incentive for Pyongyang, if
not for Washington. China was the most critical factor
in achieving a group consensus in the form of the Joint
Statement of Principles issued by the participants in
the fourth round of Six Party talks on September 19,
2005, the first-ever successful outcome of the on-again,
off-again multilateral dialogue of more than 2 years.
This was a validation of the negotiated approach to
the second nuclear standoff on the Korean peninsula
that both Pyongyang and Washington have resisted at
various times.
13

China also may have played a critical backstage role
in persuading Pyongyang to moderate provocative
rhetoric or action. China played a further role in
downsizing Pyongyang’s demand for a nonaggression
treaty, a demand that initially had called for a security
pledge or guarantee as well as the removal of the
DPRK from the U.S. list of terrorist states. However,
Chinese persuasive power has had very real limits.
China’s efforts to dissuade North Korea from carrying
out nuclear or missile tests did not prevent Pyongyang
from detonating a nuclear device on October 9, 2006, or
launching a Taipodong II (along with six other missiles
of different types) on July 5, 2006.
In sum, China’s mediation diplomacy since early
2003 has been the primary factor in facilitating and
energizing multilateral dialogues among the Northeast
Asian states concerned in the nuclear standoff. Whereas
in 1994 China wanted the United States and the DPRK
to handle their dispute bilaterally, from 2003 to 2005
China succeeded in drawing North Korea into a unique
regional, multilateral setting that Pyongyang—as well
as Beijing—had previously foresworn in a quest for
direct bilateral negotiations with the United States.
Economic Interaction. Chinese–North Korean economic relations over the years are notable in several
respects. First, Sino-DPRK trade is closely keyed to
and determined by turbulent political trajectories. The
Chinese percentage of total North Korean foreign trade
has fluctuated greatly over the years: (1) 25–60 percent
(the absolute value was around U.S.$100 million) in the
1950s; (2) about 30 percent in the 1960s until 1967, after
which the ratio declined to around 10 percent in the
wake of the Cultural Revolution; (3) increased to about
20 percent since 1973 (to the level of U.S.$300–$600
million); and (4) declined to the 10–20 percent range in
the 1980s, although its total value had risen to U.S.$3–
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$4 billion. In the first post–Cold War decade, the 1990s,
the ratio started at 10.1 percent in 1990 but increased
dramatically to around 30 percent in 1991 and stayed
in this range until 1998, even as its total value began
to decline from $899 million in 1993 to $371 million in
1999. Nonetheless, due to the renormalization process
underway since 1999, Sino-DPRK trade registered a 32
percent increase in 2000 ($488 million) and a whopping
80 percent increase in the first half of 2001 ($311
million) after 2 years of consecutive decreases in 1998
and 1999.
Despite the dramatic increases in total value, the
China share declined from 29 percent in 1998 to 20
percent in 2000, only to start rising again, more than
tripling from $488 million in 2000 to a new all-time high
of just more than $1.58 billion in 2005, demonstrating
the paradoxical effect of the second U.S.-DPRK nuclear
standoff, which has accelerated Pyongyang’s economic
isolation due to the reinforced sanctions by Washington
and Tokyo, while deepening North Korea’s dependence
on Beijing and Seoul for trade and aid (see Table 1).
Year Exports
to
North
Korea
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

Imports
from
North
Korea

N/A
374
300
281
273
226

N/A
303
231
304
254
272

Total
North
KoreanChinese
Trade
N/A
677
531
585
527
498

231
233

257
277

488
510

Chinese
Trade
Balance
with North
Korea
N/A
+71
+69
-23
+19
-46

Percent
Change in
North KoreanChinese Trade

-26
-44

-2%
+5%

Table 1. China’s Trade with North Korea,
1990-2005 (Unit: U.S.$ million) (continued).
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N/A
N/A
-22%
+10%
-10%
-6%

Year Exports
to
North
Korea

Imports
from
North
Korea

277
345
377
358
525
541
602
424
486
497
531
355
329
451
571
467
628
799
1,081

236
234
185
125
86
155
297
199
64
68
121
57
42
37
167
271
396
585
499

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

Total
North
KoreanChinese
Trade
513
579
562
483
611
696
899
623
550
565
652
412
371
488
738
738
1,024
1,384
1,580

Chinese
Trade
Balance
with North
Korea
+41
+111
+192
+233
+439
+386
+305
+225
+422
+429
+410
+298
+287
+414
+404
+196
+232
+214
+582

Percent
Change in
North KoreanChinese Trade
+1%
+13%
-3%
-14%
+27%
+14%
+29%
-31%
-12%
+3%
+15%
-37%
-10%
+32%
+51%
+0%
+39%
+35%
+14%

Sources: Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations,
People’s Republic of China at www.moftec.gov.cn/moftec/official/html/
statistics_data; 1996 Diplomatic White Paper Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), Republic of Korea (ROK), p. 348;
1997 Diplomatic White Paper, pp. 396 and 400; 1998 Diplomatic
White Paper, pp. 481 and 486; 2000 Diplomatic White Paper, p.
496; 2001 Diplomatic White Paper, p. 483; 2002 Diplomatic White
Paper, p. 497; available at www.mofat.go.kr.

Table 1. China’s Trade with North Korea,
1990-2005 (Unit: U.S.$ million) (concluded).
Second, as Table 1 indicates, North Korea’s trade
deficits with China have been chronic and substantial.
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During the 27 years from 1979 to 2005, the DPRK has
enjoyed an annual surplus for only 4 years. Its trade
deficit has amounted to a cumulative total of $4.68
billion between 1990 and 2003—imports to the DPRK
worth $6.7 billion and exports worth $2.1 billion. The
cumulative total of the trade deficits for North Korea
amounted to $3.85 billion during the period 1990–
2000, with total imports from China at $5.1 billion and
total exports to China only $1.3 billion. North Korea’s
trade deficit is not likely to improve for a long time,
because it does not have high value products to export
and because its primary exportable commodities are
losing competitiveness in the Chinese market. In 2005,
North Korea’s trade deficit hit an all-time high of $1.1
billion.
While China remained North Korea’s largest trade
partner in the 1990s in terms of total value, Beijing has
allowed Pyongyang to run average annual deficits
of $318 million for 1990–1994, $369 million for 1995–
1999, and $423 million for 2000–2005. China’s role in
North Korea’s trade would be even larger if barter
transactions and aid were factored into these figures.
In contrast, South Korea’s trade with China in a single
year (2004) generated a huge surplus of $20.2 billion.
Although the exact amount and terms of China’s
aid to North Korea remain unclear, it is generally
estimated at one-quarter to one-third of China’s
overall foreign aid. By mid-1994, China accounted for
about three-quarters of North Korea’s oil and food
imports.18 Whether intentionally or not, Beijing became
more deeply involved, playing an increasingly active
and, indeed, crucial year-to-year role in the politics
of regime survival by providing more aid in a wider
variety of forms: direct government-to-government
aid, subsidized cross-border trade, and private barter
transactions.
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North Korea’s dependency on China for aid has
grown unabated and has intensified even in the face
of its hardline policy towards Pyongyang’s rogue state
strategy. Recent estimates of China’s aid to North Korea
are in the range of 1 million tons of wheat and rice and
500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per annum, accounting
for 70 to 90 percent of North Korea’s fuel imports
and about one-third of its total food imports. With
the cessation of America’s heavy fuel oil delivery in
November 2002, China’s oil aid and exports may now
be approaching nearly 100 percent of North Korea’s
energy imports.19 As a way of enticing Pyongyang to the
Six Party talks in late August 2003, President Hu Jintao
promised Kim Jong II greater economic aid than in
previous years. The Chinese government has extended
indirect aid by allowing private economic transactions
between North Korean and Chinese companies in the
border area, despite North Korea’s mounting debt and
the bankruptcy of many Chinese companies resulting
from North Korean defaults on debts.
Despite being Pyongyang’s external life support
system, especially since November 2002 when the
United States halted monthly delivery of heavy fuel oil,
China does not, to its frustration, receive as much North
Korean gratitude as it would like nor does it wield as
much leverage as Washington would have us believe,
precisely because Pyongyang knows that China’s aid
is in its own self-interest. As one senior Chinese leader
said to a visiting U.S. scholar in the context of expressing
China’s opposition to any economic sanctions on North
Korea, “We can either send food to North Korea or they
will send refugees to us—either way, we feed them. It
is more convenient to feed them in North Korea than
in China.”20 Thus Beijing is cautious to a fault for fear
of provoking and/or causing collapse in the North
by withholding too much aid, thereby precipitating
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a host of destabilizing social, economic, and political
consequences.
For the DPRK, the most critical challenge is
survival in the post–Cold War, post-communist world
of globalization, and its economic relations with
China are motivated by this survival goal. To this
end, Pyongyang seeks increasing amounts of aid as an
external life-support system, hoping to avoid triggering
a cataclysmic system collapse.
While providing the diplomatic and economic
support to the DPRK that was necessary to infuse
Kim Jong Il with enough confidence to remain a part
of the Six Party process, China also has made it clear
to Washington, Seoul, Moscow, and Tokyo that the
peaceful coexistence of the two Korean states on the
peninsula is now in the common interest of all, in
the face of the alternative of having to cope with the
turmoil and chaos that would follow a system collapse
in Pyongyang.
In the face of a growing multifaceted sanctions
strategy by Washington and Tokyo in recent years,
especially the September 19, 2005, Joint Statement of
Principles, Beijing’s multidimensional support for
North Korea has been greatly accelerated. Sino-DPRK
trade has more than doubled from $738 million in
2002 to $1.6 billion in 2005 with China’s share of North
Korean foreign trade hitting an all-time high of 40
percent. More significantly, economic ties in various
forms of investment are now expanding—from basic
industry to mining exploration, drilling in the sea, and
various construction projects including a plan to build
a new mass-transportation bridge from North Korea’s
border city of Sinuiju to Dandong, China, over the
Yalu River. Beijing has unmistakably shifted its gears
from mere life-support aid to developmental aid in late
2005.
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Russia and North Korea.
From the late 1950s onward, Kim Il Sung successfully exploited the emerging Sino–Soviet rift, gaining
independence from both of the two large socialist states.
Moscow and Beijing each tried to offset the other’s
influence in North Korea with generous economic
and military assistance. For a time, Pyongyang sided
with Mao against the former Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR), then tilted toward Moscow in the
late 1960s during the years of Mao’s Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution. Thereafter, North Korea adapted
adroitly to its two patrons, whose enmity and status
competition continued through the 1970s and most
of the 1980s. Moscow’s aim was to keep Pyongyang
from slipping too close to China; the Soviets did not
want a new war attempting to reunify Korea.21 Soviet
diplomatic representatives in Pyongyang became
accustomed to finding themselves severely isolated in
an inhospitable environment.
Regarding influence in Korea, it is likely that Soviet
leaders believed they labored under a permanent,
built-in disadvantage when compared with the PRC.
Nonetheless, because the DPRK proved a useful partner
in confronting the United States and insulating against
U.S. troops in South Korea, the USSR continued to
provide Pyongyang with the technology and products
that it requested. But Moscow viewed North Korea as
a functional buffer rather than as a reliable ally.22
Political and Diplomatic Interaction. Moscow’s
skewed two-Koreas policy started with a bang in 1990
but ended with a whimper. Ironically, if Moscow was
the chief catalyst for transforming the political and
strategic landscape of Northeast Asia, including the
initiation of mutual recognition and the entry of the
two Koreas into the UN, Beijing became the major
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beneficiary, occupying the pivotal position from
which it could exert greater influence over Seoul and
Pyongyang. As if to emulate Beijing’s much-touted
equidistance policy, since the mid-1990s Moscow
has retreated significantly from its skewed posture,
moving toward a more balanced policy as a way of
reassuring Pyongyang and thus enhancing its leverage
and resuming its great-power role in the politics of a
divided Korea.
When the Kremlin announced in September 1990
that it would normalize relations with Seoul, the
DPRK said in a memorandum that normalization
would imply an end to the DPRK–USSR alliance and
that North Korea would have “no other choice but to
take measures to provide for ourselves some weapons
for which we have so far relied on the alliance.”23 The
North Koreans even threatened to retaliate against the
Soviet Union by supporting Japanese claims to the
South Kuril Islands, and they began referring to ROK–
USSR relations as “diplomacy purchased by dollars.”24
Moscow responded by admonishing the DPRK that no
matter how hard the USSR tried to help its neighbor,
it would be difficult to solve its problems until the
confrontation and arms race underway on the Korean
peninsula ceased and until the North shed its semiisolation from economic contacts with the majority of
developed countries.25
The political relationship between Moscow and
Pyongyang was defined during the Cold War by the
1961 Mutual Defense and Cooperation Treaty. When
the Soviet Union dissolved, Russia initially agreed to
honor the USSR’s extant treaties and commitments,
although they would be subject to renegotiation.
Russian President Boris Yeltsin sent a personal envoy
to Pyongyang to explain Russia’s policy and to probe
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North Korea’s reaction. The North Koreans considered
the 1961 treaty “outdated.” Not only did Pyongyang
embrace termination of the treaty, but North Korea
also dismissed Moscow’s reassurances that the Russian
nuclear umbrella still covered North Korea, implying a
revision of Pyongyang’s concept of national security.26
What is most striking about Moscow’s relations
with Pyongyang, therefore, is not that there were
vicissitudes and fluctuations throughout the 1990s—
for indeed there were many—but that the downward
spiral of Russia-DPRK relations resulting from a series
of domestic and external shocks has been reversed and
put back on a renormalization track since the mid1990s. The period of 1998 to 1999 was a turning point
in Moscow’s agonizing reappraisal of its perceived
rapidly worsening international environment and the
reconstruction of its ruling coalition. The statist balance
of political elite interests was shattered by the August
1998 financial crisis in Russia and, more importantly,
by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/
U.S. war in Kosovo.27
The Moscow-Pyongyang renormalization process
clearly gained momentum when Vladimir Putin’s
vigorous pursuit of realpolitik intersected with Kim
Jong Il’s new diplomatic opening to the outside world.
In July 2000, Putin became not only the first Kremlin
leader ever to visit the neighboring communist country
but also the first among the Big Four to make an official
state visit to North Korea. A year later in August 2001,
Kim Jong Il returned Putin’s visit in a bizarre 6,000-mile
train trip across Russia to Moscow that inconvenienced
thousands of Russian rail travelers along the way—it
took more than a year just to organize it. This was
part of Kim Jong Il’s coming-out party, evidenced also
in 2000 by a visit to China in May, an inter-Korean

22

summit in June, and a visit to Pyongyang by then U.S.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in October.
President Vladimir Putin’s vigorous personal
diplomacy in 2000 and 2001 was a dramatic step not
only toward bringing Moscow back into the rapidly
changing Korean peninsular equation in order to
reassert Russia’s great power identity, but also
toward countering troublesome American policies.
The United States loomed large in the second PutinKim summit in Moscow. In the DPRK-Russia Moscow
Declaration of August 4, 2001,28 both parties addressed
“international” (read “U.S.”) and bilateral issues. Four
of the eight points seem designed to send a strong
message to the United States: “a just new world order”
(point one); the 1972 anti-ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty
as a cornerstone of global strategic stability (point
two); a Korean reunification process by independent
means and without foreign interference (point seven);
and the pullout of U.S. forces from South Korea as a
“pressing issue,” regarding which Putin expressed his
“understanding” (point eight). The remaining points
have to do with the promotion of bilateral political and
economic cooperation, especially “the plan for building
railways linking the north and the south of the Korean
peninsula [as well as mention of] Russia and Europe
on the principle of the mutual interests recognized in
the worldwide practice” (point six).
This joint declaration was far more muscular and
provocative than the June 2000 South–North Joint
Declaration, including as it did trenchant attacks
against infringement of state sovereignty under the
pretext of humanitarianism and against the U.S.
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and National Missile
Defense (NMD) programs. The Russian–North Korean
summit captured global prime-time and headlines
when Putin revealed that the North Korean leader had
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pledged to eliminate his country’s Taepodong missile
program—a key rationale for NMD—if Western
countries (meaning the United States) would provide
access to rocket boosters for peaceful space research.
Putin also managed to put Kim Jong Il’s “satellites
for missiles” issue on the agenda of the G-8 summit
meeting in Japan.
Since these mutual visits, Kim Jong Il has stayed in
close touch with Russian representatives in Pyongyang
and has made visits to the Russian Far East to examine
the implementation of Russian economic programs.29
In August 2002, Putin and Kim held a third summit
in Vladivostok.30 There, Putin allegedly assured Kim
Jong Il that Moscow would not support any U.S.
efforts to impose a so-called “Iraqi scenario” on North
Korea and that Russia would not join any anti-DPRK
international coalition. Moreover, Russia would try to
help the DPRK distance itself from the so-called “axis
of evil” and to escape its U.S.-sponsored international
isolation.31 These commitments are known as the
“Putin formula.” In connection with the events in Iraq,
the Russian president stated: “In recent times—and
there have been many crises recently—Russia has not
once permitted itself the luxury of being drawn directly
into any of these crises,” and Putin also promised to do
everything within his power “to prevent Russia being
dragged into the Iraq crisis in any form.”32
Security Interaction. New North Korean policy
toward Russia can best be described as “old wine in
new bottles.” It is based on shared geopolitical interests,
especially with respect to hardline U.S. policy and
the U.S. military presence on the peninsula. It is rein
forced by personal chemistry and close ties between
Chairman Kim and President Putin, and it is cemented
by interlocking institutional networks connecting
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North Korean and Russian bureaucracies at the central
and local levels.33
A common belief in Russia is that the DPRK is
a militarily weak state that faces overwhelmingly
powerful opponents and truly must fear for its own
survival. Therefore, its efforts are viewed as defensive
in nature. In the wake of the NATO-led war in former
Yugoslavia, Russians were predicting that it was only
a matter of time before the United States took action
against North Korea.34 Needless to say, George W.
Bush’s tough policy toward Pyongyang has driven
Moscow and Pyongyang toward closer ties. Russian
analysts believe that a more robust Russian presence
in North Korea could be useful to Pyongyang and to
the peace process on the peninsula because reinforced
contacts with Russia would help the DPRK feel more
self-confident and consequently encourage it to behave
in a more pragmatic manner in relations with other
states.35
In general, Russia seeks a multinational arrangement for Korean peace and security, and it supports
the notion that Korean questions should be resolved by
the Koreans themselves if possible. Russia opposes
neither U.S.–North Korean bilateral talks nor four-way
talks among the United States, China, and North and
South Korea, although the latter configuration makes
Moscow feel sidelined. Russia asserts, however, that the
United States alone cannot untie the “Korean knot” but
must rely on a multilateral approach to creating lasting
peace and security in NEA. Russian policymakers
believe that Pyongyang is genuinely interested in
reform but is isolated and paranoid; they argue that
renewed friendship and trust between Russia and North
Korea will help Pyongyang regain self-confidence and
engage South Korea bilaterally in a constructive way,
just as in its international relations.36
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Russia was a serious supporter of the Six Party
talks on the nuclear standoff. According to Alexander
Zhebin, Russia was invited to join the Six Party talks at
Pyongyang’s insistence:
Some observers considered it a foreign-policy “failure”
that Russia was not invited to the trilateral meeting in
Beijing in April 2003, so when the DPRK decided to ask
Russia to take part in the Six Party talks on August 27–
29, 2003, in Beijing, this was welcomed in Russia as “a
positive step” with a certain feeling of relief.37

At times, however, the Russians oversold their case,
as when a deputy foreign minister declared, “Without
taking Russia’s interest into account, [resolution of a
nuclear crisis] is almost impossible.”38 Russia has tried
to build up its relevance by enhancing its leverage in
Pyongyang, mostly by proposing to involve North
Korea in its plans to develop a Northeast Asian energy
network. North Korea, however, usually detects the
transparency of such schemes.
The on-again, off-again nuclear talks have allowed
Russia to pursue its goal of working with both North
and South Korea. In January 2003, South Korean officials
asked Moscow to persuade North Korea to rescind
its decision to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). Putin sent his deputy foreign minister
to Pyongyang to deliver a message to Kim Jong Il
on how to resolve the nuclear crisis. The proposed
package included nuclear-free status for the Korean
peninsula, a security guarantee for the DPRK, and a
resumption of humanitarian assistance and economic
aid to North Korea.39 The proposal never got off the
ground, and both the United States and the ROK view
China as the real key player in terms of influencing
the Pyongyang regime. The Three Party and Six Party
talks on the nuclear issue all therefore have been held
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in Beijing. Remembering its exclusion from the 1994
Agreed Framework and from the Korean Energy
Development Organization (KEDO), Russia offered
to build a nuclear power plant in North Korea as part
of an effort to diffuse the crisis, and a Russian power
company proposed constructing a power line from
Vladivostok to Chongjin.40
Once the Six Party talks got underway in August 2003,
Moscow proposed a package solution in close alignment with Beijing’s approach. Russia’s solution was
based on the principles of a stage-by-stage process and
parallel synchronized implementation of coordinated
measures by the concerned parties.41 Russian officials
have spoken out repeatedly for a peaceful, negotiated
resolution of the crisis; they have warned of the dangers
of a military solution; they have rejected sanctions or other
pressure as counterproductive; and they have opposed
referring the North Korean nuclear issue to the UNSC.
Russian observers have warned that pressure is likely
to backfire by cornering Pyongyang and increasing its
sense of insecurity. Moreover, Moscow has volunteered
to help provide North Korea with international security
guarantees as well as energy assistance.42
Sensing that its strategic importance to Russia is
growing under President Putin, Pyongyang hopes that
Russia will be able to assist in solving several of its problems by providing or creating (1) de facto protection
against possible military threats from the United States;
(2) Russian backing in bargaining with Washington
over nuclear and missile matters; (3) U.S. interest in
accommodating North Korean demands and requests
as a means of countering Russian influence with the
DPRK; (4) renewed Russian military aid, including
spare parts for existing weapons and hardware as well
as new, more technologically advanced armaments; (5)
Russian participation in the modernization of industrial
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facilities built by the Soviet Union during the early Cold
War period; (6) reliable long-term deliveries of Russian
oil and gas; and (7) facilitating cooperation with the
DPRK by countries of the former Soviet Union.
Russia’s involvement in the Six Party talks in
2003–06 was cautious but committed. Although China
played the frontline role, ensuring that the talks got off
the ground and continued, Russia also came to play an
important supporting role. Ranking Russian diplomats
described China as a “locomotive” driving the Six
Party dialogue, whereas Russia’s role was to play
“whisper diplomacy.”43 Russia and China did work
to coordinate strategically during summit meetings in
early 2004; both countries stated their desire to keep
North Korea nuclear weapons free.44 In 2003, Russia
abstained from an International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) vote on whether to send the North Korean
nuclear issue to the UNSC, effectively announcing
its preferred support for the Six Party format and for
continued negotiation. During the third round of talks,
Russia joined with China and South Korea in offering
to supply energy—in the form of fuel oil—to North
Korea in exchange for the DPRK halting any further
development of its nuclear programs. Throughout the
talks, Russia continued to supply modest food aid to
North Korea and to have meetings with North Korean
representatives.
Economic Interaction. Ironically, while Russia was
angling with South Korea in the mid-1990s for loans
and debt relief, Russia’s logic for continuing to pursue
relations with the DPRK in the same period revolved
around hopes of receiving payments on debts owed to
Moscow by Pyongyang. Pyongyang had announced its
refusal to repay a (estimated at $U.S.3-5 billion) when
Yeltsin announced his intention not to renew the 1961
treaty and to halt weapons and technology transfers.
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Although Russia traditionally has been North Korea’s
main supplier of equipment, petroleum products,
timber, coal, fish, and marine products, approximately
70 percent of North Korea’s estimated $4 billion debt
to Russia originates from unpaid-for weapons.45
In the wake of President Putin’s visit to Pyongyang,
North Korea is becoming increasingly active in economic contacts with Russia, which was exactly what Putin
had hoped would result from the summit meeting.
DPRK authorities have requested Russian assistance in
the reconstruction of a number of facilities built by the
Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s. The problem is that
the DPRK does not have money to pay for the services,
insisting on barter deals and low-interest credits
instead. However, the Russian government, as it faces
persistent economic and financial hurdles, cannot agree
to such conditions. Barter is unlikely because of the
Russian market economy and the fact that government
authorities cannot force Russian companies to accept
goods they do not need or want—although there were
reports of a developing intra-Russian barter economy
in the mid-1990s.46
The DPRK has presented a list of goods it could
export to Russia in exchange for Russian goods and
services, but Russian officials say that most of the items
on the North Korean list are of no interest to Russian
companies. One possible way out of the predicament is
to have South Korean banks and firms provide credits to
the DPRK to exchange for Russian technical assistance.
Perhaps the most revealing part of the DPRK–Russia
Moscow Declaration of August 4, 2001, is embodied
in point five: “In order to carry out a series of bilateral
plans, the Russian side confirmed its intention to use
the method of drawing financial resources from outsiders
on the basis of understanding of the Korean side.”47 In
other words, Moscow and Pyongyang are now looking
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to Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo to foot the bill.
Attempts are currently being made to find interested
parties in the ROK.
Meanwhile, Pyongyang has asked Russian authorities to set aside logging areas for DPRK workers in
the Russian Far East. Russia needs help with its timber
industry, particularly given increased demand from
China, and North Korean wages are very low. There
was even some speculation in the Russian news
media following the summit that Putin had allowed
Pyongyang to write off $50 million of its debt by
providing free labor to timber camps in the Russian
Far East.
The presence of approximately 12,000 North
Korean workers in the Russian Far East already has
created problems not only because they have sought
political asylum, but also because they have become
involved in illegal activities such as smuggling and
drug trafficking.48 The Russian press also has reported
North Korean involvement in counterfeiting and
poaching. In addition to the migrant workers from
North Korea, the Russian Far East saw the return there
in the 1990s of ethnic Koreans who had been forcibly
relocated under the Stalin regime. Native Russians met
the returning Koreans with hostility.
Nonetheless, Russia is the only country that
might be able to absorb a North Korean workforce
that is increasingly without jobs in North Korea. At
the regional level, cooperation is growing between
North Korea and the Russian Far East; since the Soviet
period, North Korean workers have been involved in
timber projects in the region, and more recently they
also have been active in construction and agriculture.
North Korean workers help fill a labor shortage in a
region experiencing a population outflow, particularly
of working-age inhabitants. In April 2001 Moscow and
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Pyongyang apparently agreed in principle to settle the
pestering debt issue through a labor-for-debt swap
deal, whereby North Korea would cover $5.5 billion in
Soviet-era debt during the next 30 years by supplying
workers who would toil unpaid in Russian labor camps
across Siberia. About 90 percent of Pyongyang’s debts
to Moscow was covered in such a manner in 2000, to
the tune of $50.4 million.49 At this rate, it would take
109 years to pay off Pyongyang’s debts to Moscow.
On the whole, DPRK–Russian economic ties do not
look very promising, and the development of serious
investment and trade relations will likely need to
involve South Korea. Russians complain that the DPRK
still wants to build economic relations “along the lines
of the old Soviet–DPRK model of getting things free-ofcharge.” On a brighter note, cultural cooperation has
resumed in recent years. Russian performing artists
are again touring in Pyongyang, and North Korean
students can again be found in Russian schools50 (see
Table 2).
Still, Moscow seems excited about the geo-economic
opportunities resulting from increasing inter-Korean
economic cooperation, particularly the prospect of
rail links across the demilitarized zone (DMZ), which
Russia hopes would create a new trans-Siberian freight
route linking South Korea to Europe via North Korea
and the Russian Far East. The difficulty is in leveling
the playing field of the highly asymmetrical Moscow–
Pyongyang–Seoul economic interdependence by
integrating and reconciling Russia’s technical knowhow and natural resources, North Korea’s labor, and
South Korea’s capital—as well as Russia’s debt to
Seoul ($1.8 billion) and Pyongyang’s debt to Moscow
(about $3–$5 billion)—in a mutually beneficial and
complementary way.

31

Exports
Imports
Total North
Russian Trade Percent Change
Year to North from North
KoreanBalance with in North KoreanKorea
Korea
Russian Trade
North Korea
Russian Trade
1990
1,315
908
2,223
+407
1991
194
171
365
+23
-84%
1992
277
65
342
+212
-6%
1993
188
39
227
+149
-34%
1994
100
40
140
+60
-38%
1995
68
16
84
+52
-40%
1996
36
29
65
+7
-23%
1997
67
17
84
+50
+29%
1998
57
8
65
+49
-23%
1999
48
2
50
+46
-23%
2000
43
3
46
+40
-8%
2001
64
5
69
+59
+50%
2002
77
4
81
+73
+17%
2003
116
3
119
+113
+47%
2004
205
5
210
+200
+76%
2005
224
8
232
+216
+9.3%

Sources: 1997 Diplomatic White Paper, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade (MOFAT), Republic of Korea (ROK), pp. 396, 401; 1998
Diplomatic White Paper, pp. 481 and 486; 2000 Diplomatic White
Paper, p. 497; 2001 Diplomatic White Paper, p. 484; 2002 Diplomatic
White Paper, p. 497; available at www.mofat.go.kr; KOTRA at www.
kotra.or.kr; ROK Ministry of Unification.

Table 2. Russia’s Trade with North Korea, 1990-2004
(Unit: $U.S.1 million).
In order for this dream of an Iron Silk Road to come
true the Russian way, however, Moscow would have
to overcome some major obstacles, including the huge
cost ($9 billion); Russia’s economic weakness; China’s
relative advantage in connecting its own railway to the
inter-Korean Seoul-Sinuiju line (Kyongui Line), which
would make it the gateway for cargo travel from Asia
to Europe; North Korea’s ongoing economic crisis and
unpredictable behavior; and the politics of ideological
and regional fragmentation in South Korea. Fearing
that the new rail projects would diminish the role of Sea
of Japan ports that depend on trade with South Korea,
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some Russian officials from the territory northeast of
Vladivostok are opposed to the development of a new
Russian-Korean rail corridor.51
Regional relations provide only a short-term basis
for economic relations, especially through contracts for
North Korean guest workers, but the expanded North
Korean presence in the Russian Far East has raised
new concerns about Pyongyang’s involvement in
nuclear smuggling, the heroin trade, and counterfeiting
activities in Russia. Russian–North Korean regional
cooperation will accelerate with the progress of major
development projects such as that on the Tumen River,
the Kovyktinskoe gas pipeline, and the inter-Korean
railway, but such progress will depend on the ability
to attract considerable outside investment, especially
from Japan but also from South Korea and China.
Russia’s ability to influence North Korea is related
in no small degree to its struggle to adjust its national
identity. In the early 1990s, Russia was concentrating
on becoming a respected, democratic member of the
Western community. The United States and Europe
were seen as the main political and ideological allies
of postcommunist Russia, the principal source of
economic aid, and the model for Russian development.
This vision drove the Russian Federation and the
DPRK apart. Yet, with its difficulties in implementing
and consolidating Western-style reforms and the threat
of NATO expansion, Russia came to suffer pangs of
disillusionment with the West and began to emphasize
security concerns in its foreign policy, which became
increasingly conservative and nationalistic. In this
milieu, North Korea found more favor and solidarity
with the Kremlin. The Korean peninsula resumed
prominence in Russian eyes, and Russia’s involvement
in North Korea—but perhaps not yet its influence over
Pyongyang—began to renew itself.
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Japan and North Korea.
Political and Diplomatic Interaction. From the time it
regained sovereignty in 1951 until the end of the Cold
War, Japan made little effort to normalize ties with
North Korea. There was negligible political or economic gain to be had by establishing official diplomatic
relations with Pyongyang, and it appeared that the lack
of political relations was not impacting the economic
ties that did exist. Japan was firmly enmeshed in the U.S.
alliance structure in East Asia and did not want to upset
the balance by pursuing relations with the communist
DPRK. Japan therefore had scant incentive to deviate
from the policy of nonrecognition. In addition, in 1955
the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan
(Chongryun in Korean or Chosen Soren in Japanese)
established itself as a pro-North Korean organization
and thereby became a de facto embassy for Pyongyang,
representing North Korean interests in Japan through
lobbying and occasional protest activities.
Once Japan had signed the 1965 normalization
treaty with South Korea, Pyongyang had less desire
to pursue normalization, given its opposition to crossrecognition of the two Korean states and its insistence
on regarding diplomatic ties as tantamount to absolute
international legitimation. With a debt of hundreds of
millions of dollars owed to Japan from trade relations,
Pyongyang also was apprehensive over the prospect
of finding itself at a bargaining table where it might
be called on to pay such a debt (estimated at $530
million, with Pyongyang initially defaulting from 1972
to 1975).
In the late 1980s, the confluence of the Gorbachev
revolution in Soviet foreign policy, Seoul’s Nordpolitik,
and Beijing–Moscow renormalization began to under-
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mine the deep structure of Cold-War politics in NEA
in general and on the Korean peninsula in particular.
In July 1988, newly elected South Korean President
Roh Tae Woo promulgated Nordpolitik, a major policy
initiative aimed at improving inter-Korean relations
by expanding South Korean political, economic, and
cultural ties with the Soviet Union, China, and other
socialist states. It also urged Tokyo and Washington
to develop better relations with North Korea. When
Gorbachev formulated a new Asia-Pacific strategy,
one of the most interesting and groundbreaking ideas
was Soviet recognition of Seoul, which was achieved
in 1990, paving the road to Sino–ROK normalization
2 years later. The United States had relaxed its rigid
North Korea policy in 1988, creating space for its allies
to undertake more flexible foreign policies toward the
DPRK.
North Korea, in turn, was watching the financial and
political support by its socialist allies recede. In the late
1980s and early 1990s, Japan was viewed as being on
a trajectory to surpass the United States as the largest
economy in the world and so seemed a ripe target for
a North Korean state badly in need of support in the
form of foreign capital and technology transfer. Japan,
for its part, wanted to be sure that it was in place to
play a leadership role in the emerging Northeast Asian
order.
Tokyo and Pyongyang, in fact, were both shocked
by the outcome of the Soviet–South Korean summit
meeting held in San Francisco in June 1990, though
for different reasons. The DPRK was shocked by
the defection of the rapidly disintegrating socialist
superpower (the Berlin wall had fallen on November
9, 1988) from its one-Korea policy and sought to
compensate for the diplomatic setback with its own
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surprise normalization. Japan, shocked by the success
of Seoul’s Nordpolitik and its ability to reach out to the
USSR and the PRC, felt compelled to act in the name of
regional leadership.
Given the ups and downs of inter-Korean
diplomacy, the possibility of either a Korea suddenly
reunified under terms favorable to increasingly
powerful South Korea or a desperate North Korea
lashing out with weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
seemed very real. Japan therefore found it increasingly
difficult to be a bystander in inter-Korean relations that
now had the potential to directly impact Japan or to be
the driving force of new and uncertain international
developments throughout the Asia-Pacific region.
Japan had to contemplate the possibility either of
another destructive inter-Korean war, which this time
would probably involve Japan directly, or of a sudden
reunification with uncertain ramifications.52
Therefore, on September 28, 1990, the leaders of
Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) delegation
joined with the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) delegation
and the DPRK’s Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) to sign
a joint declaration agreeing to hold normalization talks.
The most important but controversial provision of the
eight-point joint declaration stated that Japan should
compensate North Korea not only for the damage
caused during the colonial rule, but also for the “losses
suffered by the Korean people in the 45 years” since
World War II. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
then conducted a rearguard delaying action for years.
After the eight rapid-fire rounds of talks between
January 1991 and November 1992, both Pyongyang
and Tokyo backed away from holding any additional
talks. With the signing of the 1994 Agreed Framework
between the United States and North Korea, Pyongyang
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began probing into whether Japan might welcome
additional talks, but it received only a lukewarm
response. LDP leader Watanabe Michio failed to restart
the talks, and the 1995 and 1996 editions of Japan’s
White Paper on Defense still listed North Korea as the
“major destabilizing factor” with regard to East Asian
security.
Three new rounds of talks were held from April
to October 2000 in Tokyo, Pyongyang, and Beijing,
respectively. The ninth round in April involved
discussions of Japan’s colonial history and North
Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens during the
1970s and 1980s. Japan suspected that North Korea
had abducted 11 Japanese citizens from coastal towns
across the archipelago and in Europe. In August, at the
10th round of talks, North Korea reportedly agreed
to stop demanding “reparations” and to discuss
“compensation” instead; Japan offered a $200 million
loan and $300 million of economic cooperation aid, as
opposed to “compensation.” Japan also emphasized
the importance of solving the abduction issue, as
the chief Japanese negotiator pointed out that any
normalization treaty to come out of the talks would
need the approval of the Diet, which would not be
forthcoming without public support that would be
contingent in turn on resolution of abduction issue. At
the 11th round of talks, Japan offered 500,000 tons of
rice53 and a very large economic package, as quid pro
quo for North Korea’s moderation of the missile threat
and satisfactory resolution of the abduction issue.54
North Korean negotiators rejected the offer, and the
talks collapsed in only 2 days, with no mention of a
date for the next round of normalization talks.
These normalization talks again fell apart because of
their failure to resolve two major issues: North Korea’s
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demand for compensation and Japan’s demand for
accountability on the abduction of Japanese citizens.
North Korea persisted in its denial of any knowledge
about the abduction issue, while refusing to accept the
Japanese proposal to offer economic aid rather than
reparations. In view of the uncompromising positions
taken by both sides on these issues at the normalization
talks, it became evident that the settlement of these
thorny issues would require a high degree of political
compromise between Tokyo and Pyongyang, probably
achieved as a package deal rather than through the
piecemeal approach.
Despite the Japanese sinking of a North Korean spy
ship in December 2001, the year 2002 under Koizumi’s
leadership witnessed some progress in relations
between Japan and North Korea. Japanese and North
Korean Red Cross delegations met in Beijing in April
and agreed that North Korea would conduct a “serious
investigation” into the matter of “missing” Japanese,
and in mid-August the first details of abducted Japanese
citizens began to emerge from North Korea. In addition,
Pyongyang expressed a willingness to accept Japan’s
economic aid instead of insisting on “reparations.”
Against this background, Japan announced on
August 30, 2002, that Koizumi would visit North
Korea on September 17 for a summit meeting with
Kim Jong Il. Koizumi’s decision apparently reflected
his determination to normalize relations with North
Korea, and the historic visit aroused high expectations
for a normalization breakthrough. The United States,
in contrast, on learning about the surprise visit, is said
to have put inordinate pressure on Japan not to move
too fast on normalization talks.55
In Pyongyang, at the first ever Japanese–North
Korean summit, both sides gave ground on bilateral
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issues. Kim Jong Il acknowledged North Korea’s
responsibility for abducting Japanese nationals and
offered an apology. Providing information about new
abductees about whom Japan had not asked, North
Korea revealed that out of 13 abductees, eight had died
and five were still alive. Koizumi demanded that North
Korea continue its investigation into the cases, return
those who were alive, and take measures to prevent
such activities in the future. Kim pledged not to engage
in such an act again, saying that Pyongyang already
had punished those responsible. The talks ended with
a joint declaration in which Japan promised “economic
assistance” in the form of grants, long-term soft
loans, and humanitarian assistance via international
organizations, while North Korea promised compliance
with international law, pledging to take appropriate
measures so that regrettable incidents that took place
under the abnormal bilateral relationship would never
happen in the future. Both countries agreed to fulfill
“all related international agreements” pertaining to
nuclear issues on the Korean peninsula.
To placate enraged public opinion, Japan
dispatched an official delegation to collect further
information concerning the fate of the Japanese
abductees. Pyongyang told the Japanese team that all
eight had died from “illness and disasters” and had
not been the victims of foul play. However, there were
inconsistencies in the North Korean story that further
aggravated Japanese families. The Koizumi government arranged for the five surviving abductees to
return to Japan for a 2-week visit in October. Before the
end of their visit, Japan announced that it had decided
to extend the stay of the five abductees indefinitely so
as to enable them to decide their future freely.
Following the summit, the 12th round of Japanese–
North Korean normalization talks was held in Kuala
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Lumpur, Malaysia, on October 29–30, 2002. At these
talks, it quickly became evident that there was a wide
chasm between Japan and North Korea on several key
issues. The North Korean delegation rejected Japan’s
demand for the settlement of the abduction issue,
contending that it had been resolved at the Pyongyang
summit when Kim Jong Il offered an apology with a
promise to prevent recurrences. Furthermore, North
Korea insisted that it was cooperating with Japan in
investigating details surrounding the deaths of the 8
deceased abductees. North Korea also accused Japan
of breaking its promise to return the five abductees
to Pyongyang after a 2-week home visit in Japan and
demanded that Japan keep its promise to pave the way
for the resolution of the issue; the Japanese delegation
denounced Pyongyang’s “criminal act of kidnapping.”
Japan was also insistent that North Korea maintain
the tenets of the Pyongyang Declaration, submit to its
responsibilities under the NPT, and not target Japan
with its Rodong missiles. In response to North Korea’s
desire to discuss economic cooperation as a priority
issue, Japan replied that economic aid would come
only in the aftermath of the normalization of Tokyo–
Pyongyang diplomatic relations. The talks adjourned
without agreement on the next round of normalization
talks.
Much of the abductions controversy and the 12th
round of negotiations came at the same time as the
reemergence of the North Korean nuclear issue. Thus,
when Japan–DPRK relations became stalemated after
the Kuala Lumpur meeting, there was little external
intervention to push them forward, and there was
therefore no movement in the normalization talks
in 2003. In fact, Japan, because of domestic political
pressure, became increasingly anxious about and

40

mired in the abduction issue. Despite Japan’s concern
about North Korea’s nuclear program, the issue of the
roughly two dozen Japanese citizens abducted by North
Korean agents in the 1970s for espionage training had
now come to dominate Japanese policy toward North
Korea, to the exclusion of all else.56
In early 2004 it became clear that Japan was taking
preliminary steps toward the imposition of economic
sanctions against North Korea. This led Pyongyang
to indicate its willingness to be more flexible on the
abduction issue. In fact, Pyongyang agreed to allow
a Japanese delegate to come to North Korea to pick
up eight family members of the abductees who had
returned to Japan. Koizumi, desiring to normalize
diplomatic relations with North Korea before the end
of his tenure as prime minister in 2006, indicated that
his visit to Pyongyang should not be ruled out as an
option.
On May 22, 2004, Koizumi visited Pyongyang to
hold talks with Kim Jong Il, a second Koizumi–Kim
summit in the short span of less than 2 years. Kim
agreed to allow the families of five former Japanese
abductees to go to Japan for a family reunion and
promised a new investigation into the fate of other
abductees. Koizumi emphasized the importance of a
comprehensive solution to pending security issues,
including Pyongyang’s development of nuclear
weapons and missiles. Kim reiterated North Korea’s
position that Pyongyang had to maintain a nuclear
deterrent but also stated that his goal was to achieve
a nonnuclear Korean peninsula. In addition, Kim
reassured Koizumi that the North would maintain a
moratorium on missile firing tests. For these diplomatic
victories, Japan paid richly. Koizumi promised Kim
250,000 tons of food and $10 million worth of medical
assistance through international organizations. He
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also pledged that Japan would not invoke economic
sanctions as long as North Korea observed the terms
of the joint declaration from the first summit. In
return, Pyongyang merely allowed five children of the
repatriated abductees to go to Japan with the prime
minister.
Most Japanese believed that Koizumi had paid too
high a price at the second summit, although they gave
him high marks for bringing home the family members
of the five surviving abductees.57 In an attempt to
pressure North Korea to make concessions, in June
2004 the Japanese Diet took matters into its own hands
and enacted a law to ban certain foreign ships from
making port calls in Japan. The law was designed to
prohibit the entry of North Korean ships suspected of
being engaged in illegal trafficking of money, drugs,
counterfeit currencies, and equipment and materials
used in the production of WMD. At August 2004
working-level talks, the North Korean delegation
refused to address the abductees issue in any new
way and was not ready to engage Japanese negotiators
on the nuclear issue either. Without a breakthrough
in resolving either the residual abduction issue or
Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, the Koizumi
government decided not to resume normalization
talks.
It might appear puzzling that Japan has tried as hard
as it has to normalize relations with North Korea. After
all, what could it expect to gain from the process? There
are several things. In the first place, nonnormalized
relations with North Korea stick out as a reminder of
Japan’s imperial past, and although there has been a
recent surge of nationalism in Japan, there is still a desire
among the Japanese public to wipe its World War II
slate of guilt completely clean. Economically, Japan is
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worried that it might not be able to compete effectively
on a Korean peninsula where other major powers—
China and Russia—have established diplomatic ties
with both North and South Korea. In addition, there is
a concern among some influential leaders of the LDP
and among Foreign Ministry officials that the collapse
of North Korea would create enormous economic,
political, and humanitarian problems for Japan. This
last concern enhances the possibility that DPRK–
Japan normalization might be an element in a broader
agreement that incorporates a solution to the North
Korean nuclear standoff.
Security Interaction. During the Cold War, there
was very little interaction on security issues between
Pyongyang and Tokyo. Japan was ensconced in the
protective shield of the U.S.–Japan alliance system, in
which the United States did all the heavy lifting while
Japan pursued a free ride policy that fits more closely
with mercantile realism, separating economics from
politics.58 Because North Korea’s development of missile
and nuclear programs was not yet known, Japan had
little interest in interacting with the DPRK. Pyongyang,
at home in its own ideological alliance cocoon with the
Soviet Union and China, had no compelling strategic
or ideological reason for diplomatic normalization
with Japan.
However, as the DPRK’s ballistic missile and
nuclear programs began surfacing in the early years
of the post–Cold War era, Japan may have been the
one country that was more alarmed than was South
Korea. Although the Kim Young Sam government
in Seoul was concerned over the advancing ballistic
missile and nuclear capabilities in the North, ordinary
South Korean citizens did not appear overly anxious
or threatened. The Japanese, however, having suffered
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the twin blows of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the
eve of their surrender during the last days of World
War II, felt a degree of atomic angst they had never
experienced during the Cold War.59
Japanese fear became palpable during the nuclear
crisis of April 1994, when North Korea removed spent
fuel rods from its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon and
refused to segregate rods that could provide evidence
of a plutonium-based nuclear weapon program.60
Japanese leaders let out a sigh of relief when the crisis
was defused by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s
June 1994 visit to Pyongyang, where Carter’s meeting
with Kim Il Sung paved the way for the signing of the
U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework in October 1994. The
Japanese 1995 Diplomatic Bluebook, issued after the
conclusion of the Agreed Framework, distanced Japan
somewhat from the North Korean nuclear issue. Japan
saw its main role as one of cooperation: both in the
newly established international consortium providing
energy to the DPRK and in the diplomatic realm with
the United States and the ROK.
However, the 1998 Taepodong missile shock
galvanized the Japanese government into action on
long-term plans. Tokyo decided to develop and deploy
its own spy satellite system to improve its ability
to monitor—independently of the United States—
developments on the Korean peninsula and elsewhere
in the Northeast Asian region.61 In March 1999,
Defense Agency Director General Norota Hosei told a
Diet defense panel that Japan had the right to make
preemptive military strikes if it felt a missile attack
on Japan was imminent.62 Japan therefore decided to
acquire midair refueling aircraft to enable its Air SelfDefense Force (ASDF) to conduct long-range strike
missions. Tokyo viewed this as important because
of Japan’s vulnerability linked to its lack of offensive
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military capacities that could deter or counter North
Korean attacks, capabilities that are possessed by the
United States and, to a lesser extent, South Korea.
Finally, the Japanese government authorized the
Japanese Navy and Coast Guard to pursue unidentified
ships entering Japanese territorial waters and to use
force against them if necessary.
The historic inter-Korean summit meeting of June
2000 drastically changed the political milieu in East
Asia, and Japan’s relationship with the DPRK improved
as normalization talks materialized in April, August,
and October. The dramatic summit diplomacy gave
some comfort to the Japanese regarding the prospect of
a more reasonable and responsible North Korea. Food
aid through the World Food Program (WFP) resumed,
and the issues of visitations by Japanese nationals living
in North Korea and the investigation of “missing”
Japanese citizens were broached. Then, in the wake
of the October 2002 revelation about North Korea’s
HEU nuclear weapon program and the outbreak of the
new nuclear standoff, Japan readily agreed to increase
funding and research support for the missile defense
project. Not surprisingly, Japan, as compared with
Europe and Canada, had few misgivings regarding the
implications of deploying a ballistic missile defense
system.63
North Korea’s official news media accused Japan of
blindly following the United States in pursuing a hostile
policy toward North Korea. Rodong Sinmun [Worker’s
Daily] declared that the Korean peninsula’s nuclear
issue “is not an issue for Japan to presumptuously act
upon” because it is a “bilateral issue to be resolved
between the U.S. and North Korea.” The newspaper
slammed the door on a Japanese role, asserting that
“Japan is not a party concerned with the resolution of
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the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear issue and has no pretext
or qualification to intervene.”64 In addition, referencing
national identity issues, it criticized Japan for using
“various pretexts and excuses to shelve the liquidation
of its past and deliberately slackened normalizing
relations” with North Korea.
Following a May 2003 Bush-Koizumi summit
in Crawford, Texas, Tokyo agreed to become one
of 11 nations—the one and only Asian country—
participating in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) to interdict WMD shipments to and
from countries such as North Korea. That the emphasis
is on the DPRK itself and not terrorism in general is
indicated by the fact that the 2003 Diplomatic Bluebook
lists North Korea ahead of the war on terror and WMD
as Japan’s greatest diplomatic concerns.
In the summer of 2003, the Japanese parliament
passed three “war contingency bills” that would give
the Japanese government new power to cope with
armed attacks on Japan. Such contingency legislation
had first been discussed among Japanese conservatives
some 40 years earlier but was shelved because of the
possibility that it would violate Article 9 of the Japanese
constitution. The threat posed by North Korea and
international terrorism, however, enabled the Koizumi
government to win the support of the main opposition
party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), for the
enactment of this special legislation. The legislation
enables Japan to deploy the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)
swiftly by suspending numerous restrictions hindering
its effective mobilization and operation. Indeed,
Koizumi has changed Japan’s national security policy
more than any leader since World War II. In a 5-year
period from April 2001 to April 2006, the Koizumi
government was responsible for about 60 percent of the
national security legislation or revisions enacted since
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Japan’s Self-Defense Forces were founded in 1954.65
With regard to the nuclear issue, Japan has (1) called
for complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement
(CVID) of the North Korean nuclear programs, (2)
agreed that discussions on North Korea’s security
concerns and energy assistance could be advanced
within the Six Party talks after the DPRK agreed to
CVID, and (3) asserted that there is no change in Japan’s
basic positions of settling outstanding issues based
on the Pyongyang Declaration and the normalization
of relations in a peaceful manner.66 Japan has also
continued to pursue defensive military measures, such
as an effective missile defense system.
Alongside resolution of the abduction issue,
there is no question that reduction of Pyongyang’s
military threat remains atop the list of Japanese
priorities. Japanese security planners, however, are
also concerned that a marked deterioration of political
stability in North Korea or a military miscalculation
by Pyongyang would invite great power intervention,
thereby affecting Japanese interests on the peninsula.67
Japan therefore has an interest in restraining the
United States, especially in a world in which the
Bush administration has outlined a national security
strategy that includes preventive war as a last resort.
The Koizumi administration, for example, warmly
welcomed the Bush administration’s October 2003
offer of a security guarantee for the DPRK.68
Economic Interaction. In general, Japan’s economic
role is potentially critical in the crisis over North
Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Most important,
Japan has promised North Korea, using the 1965 Japan–
South Korean normalization agreement as a model, a
large-scale economic aid package in recognition of the
“tremendous damage and suffering” Japan inflicted
during its colonial rule of Korea from 1910 to 1945.
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The aid package would go into effect after the two
countries agree to normalize relations, with Japan now
linking normalization to a resolution of the abduction
and nuclear issues.
Japanese officials are reportedly discussing a
package on the order of $5–$10 billion, an enormous
sum considering the small size of the North Korean
economy, the total gross domestic product (GDP) of
which is estimated to be $20.8 billion (as of the end of
2004). There is some fear, however, that a payment of
this magnitude would serve to prolong Kim Jong II’s
regime artificially without inducing any behavioral
changes, or possibly that the funds would be redirected
to the North Korean military. To capture the money,
Pyongyang has moved away from demands that the
package be labeled as “reparations” or “compensation”
and also has backed off from its periodic insistence
that Japan provide compensation for harms allegedly
inflicted since 1945.
There has been little indication of how the
normalization of relations would impact financial
flows to the DPRK, and this may ultimately be of more
importance to North Korean economic development
than are trade flows. The most likely initial source of
such financial flows would come from DPRK-friendly
residents of Japan. Although Chongryun is the most
active group doing business with North Korea, its
resources are extremely limited, and its political clout
has shrunk to near zero. In the event of normalization,
Korean residents of Japan will play a role as
middlemen for large firms, and local governments
and business groups in the coastal areas near North
Korea are expected to increase their investment in the
DPRK. But here, too, resources are very limited and,
in fact, declining. Japanese investors have shown only
limited interest in multilateral regional development
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programs, such as the UN Development Program’s
Tumen River Area Development Program (TRADP).69
Substantive increases in the form of direct investment
would have to come from large Japanese firms and
financial institutions, but this is likely to depend on
resolution of the DPRK debt issue. Ultimately, North
Korea will have to prove itself to be a more attractive
location for investment than China (see Table 3).
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

Japanese
Percent
Exports
Japan- Trade
from Total
Balance Change in
to North Imports
North
Korea
with North
Japan- North
Korea North Korea
Trade
Korea
Korea Trade
194
271
465
-77
N/A
246
250
496
-4
+7%
246
231
477
+15
-4%
243
222
465
+21
-3%
188
282
249
197
175
147
207
249
135
92
89
60

297
306
265
269
219
202
257
226
234
172
164
130

485
588
514
466
394
349
464
475
369
264
253
190

-109
-24
-16
-72
-44
-55
-50
+23
-99
-80
-75
-70

+4%
+21%
-13%
-9%
-15%
-11%
+33%
+2%
-22%
-28%
-4%
-25%

Sources: International Monetary Fund (1992, pp. 247, 304; 1993,
pp. 247, 305; 1994, pp. 265, 326; 1995, pp. 269-270; 1996, pp. 275,
342; 1997, pp. 342, 347; 1998, pp. 289, 349) and MOFAT (1998, pp.
396, 401; 1999, pp. 481, 481, 486; 2001, p. 497; 2002, p. 484; 2003, p.
497), available at www.mofat.gokr and KOTRA at www.kotra.or.kr;
ROK Ministry of Unification.

Table 3. Japan’s Trade with North Korea,
1990–2005 (Unit: U.S.$1 million).
49

For the near term, Japanese policymakers seem to
have quietly concluded that their wisest course is to
maintain the status quo as long as possible. For Japan,
the issue of Korean reunification poses a dilemma.
While a strong, united, and nationalistic Korea could
pose a formidable challenge or even threat to Japan, the
continuation of a divided Korea with an unpredictable
failed state in the North is no less threatening to
Japan’s security.70 The challenge, therefore, is to
navigate between the Scylla of a unified Korea, with
all its uncertainties, potential instability, and new
challenges, and the Charybdis of a divided Korea, with
the continuing danger of implosion or explosion in the
North.
Hatoyama Ichiro, who became the Japanese prime
minister in 1955, took the first steps to initiate postwar
economic ties between Tokyo and Pyongyang. But
only in November 1962 did Japan and North Korea
finally begin direct cargo shipments, on a very small
scale. Trade agreements were signed 2 years later,
in July 1964, but the impact was small. Economic
relations between North Korea and Japan were modest
throughout the 1960s but made a large jump forward
in the early 1970s. The increase in trade in 1972 and
1974 was due in part to the recognition by Tokyo’s
leftist governor Minobe Ryokichi of Chongryun—the
civil society organization of pro-Pyongyang Koreans
in Japan—as North Korea’s de facto representative in
Japan. The group was granted tax-free status.71 At trade
fairs in Pyongyang, the North Korean hosts purchased
all Japanese products on display and ordered more,
but they were not forthcoming with payments for
the goods. When North Korea defaulted in 1972 on
payments to the Kyowa Bussan Trading Company—
comprised of 20 large Japanese firms—Japan’s Ministry
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of International Trade and Industry (MITI) suspended
all export credits in 1974. Despite the lack of payments,
limited trade, usually worth no more than $500 million,
continued between Japan and North Korea. After
North Korea announced its Law on Joint Ventures in
1984, a Mitsui Trading Company subsidiary backed
a gold mine venture with North Korean residents of
Japan, and an Osaka-based firm established a cement
factory in North Korea in 1990.72
Remarkably, in 1993 Japan became North Korea’s
second largest trading partner after China and soon
thereafter temporarily became its largest partner. But
overall trade volume quickly began to decline, largely
due to the severe deterioration of North Korea’s
economy, sparked by the withdrawal of Soviet and
Chinese support in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Bilateral trade has declined for 4 years in a row since
2002, reaching a 28-year low of $190 million by the end
of 2005. More stringent Japanese port controls have
led in part to the acceptance of fewer shipments from
North Korea, but, more to the point, Japanese firms
that had been commissioning manufacture—textiles
and electrical machinery—from North Korean plants
found the DPRK too risky and Chinese alternatives too
attractive.73 Although trade levels continue to decline,
the concurrent shrinking of the North Korea economy
may mean that trade with Japan—particularly exports,
which generate hard currency—is relatively more
important to North Korea today than it was in the
1980s.
Recently a number of local governments have decided to reconsider their policy of making Chongryun
facilities either partially or entirely exempt from fixedasset taxation.74 Meanwhile, a Japanese government
crackdown on drug smuggling has caused much of the
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North Korean narcotics traffic to be rerouted through
China.75 In June 2003, Japan ordered its customs and
immigration services and its coast guard to expand
safety inspections and searches for illicit contraband
on North Korean cargo and passenger ships.
At the end of 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi
indicated his intention to consider imposing sanctions
on North Korea due to Pyongyang’s failure to respond
to Japanese requests for quick and thorough action on
the abduction issue. Although Koizumi maintained
that his government was not considering immediate
economic sanctions against North Korea, his chief
cabinet secretary did not rule out possible sanctions
in the future “if North Korea makes things worse.”
North Korea’s reactions to this possibility were
negative; a spokesman for the North Korean Foreign
Ministry denounced it as a “wanton violation” of the
Pyongyang Declaration, warning that Japan would be
responsible for “all consequences to be entailed by its
foolish moves.”76
The amended Law on Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, which took effect March 1, 2005, amounts
to a de facto economic sanction on the DPRK. The
new law bans from Japanese ports all foreign vessels
weighing more than 100 tons without proper liability
insurance regarding oil spills. Most DPRK freighters
are not covered by the required “Protection and
Indemnity Insurance,” and they in effect will be
banned from Japanese ports. It is unclear how effective
these independent sanctions against North Korea will
be; they could, in fact, result in China gaining much
more influence over North Korea. Some commentators
have begun complaining that Japan is forsaking what
influence it does have in Pyongyang. Amid declining
Japan–North Korea trade, the value of trade between
China and North Korea tripled in the 4 years from
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2001 to 2004, and it now amounts to one-half of North
Korea’s overall trade, whereas Japan and North
Korea are trading only one-fifth as much as at their
peak of economic relations in 1980. Japan simply
cannot sanction the DPRK effectively without China’s
support.
Japan’s economic relations with North Korea extend
beyond trade and investment. North Korea’s first
public aid-seeking diplomacy came in May 1995 when
Pyongyang sent a delegation to Tokyo.77 The pattern
of Japanese aid reflects developments in the political
relationship between Tokyo and Pyongyang; shipments
began in 1995 and 1996 when relations warmed and
then were suspended after the Taepodong missile launch
over Japan in 1998 and the spy ship incident in 2001. In
the face of North Korea’s unwillingness to give up its
nuclear weapons program, the Koizumi government
announced that it had ruled out the possibility of
extending any additional food aid to North Korea
beyond that agreed on at the Pyongyang summit.
Japan–North Korea bilateral trade and economic
relations have declined surprisingly since the end of
the Cold War. Although the level of trade between the
countries pales in comparison to that between Japan
and South Korea, Japan is an extremely important
source of goods and capital for the DPRK. Japan also
stands poised to be a major underwriter for economic
reforms in North Korea. In terms of engaging North
Korea since the October 2002 nuclear revelation, Japan’s
possible economic aid has acted as the biggest bunch
of carrots dangled before Pyongyang in an attempt to
ensure peace and stability in NEA and also to improve
inter-Korean relations.
In recent years, however, Japan has put in place
several laws that limit North Korea’s ability to engage
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in either legal or illegal trade with Japan. The problem is
not economic; rather, the question of abductions weighs
heavily on Japanese engagement. Many Japanese
citizens feel an emotional involvement in the fate of the
abductees, not only driven by a genuine sense of horror
at the actions of the North Korean government but also
nurtured for political gain by the LDP.78 Although the
continuing nuclear issue is also relevant for Japan’s
normalization of economic and political relations with
North Korea, it is really the abductions around which
the public imagination crystallizes. The abductions are
yet another national identity issue providing a wedge
in Japan–Korea relations and preventing the expansion
of contacts. Pyongyang, however, prefers to accuse
Japan of acting as the “shock brigade” for the U.S.led “psychological warfare and blockade operation”
in regard to its implementation of sanctions.79 Until
political issues can be settled, it is unlikely that there
will be any major changes in Japan–DPRK economic
relations.
The United States and North Korea.
Without a doubt, the United States remains
the most dominant external actor on the Korean
peninsula. Although U.S. primacy at almost any point
on the globe is widely accepted, the description is
particularly apt on the Korean peninsula. By dint of
what it is and what it does, Washington is seen in both
Seoul and Pyongyang, albeit for different reasons, as
having become part of both the Korean problem and
the Korean solution. Nonetheless, in the conception
and conduct of foreign policy, the United States is
impacted on and shaped by the changing dynamics of
its domestic politics and regional and global interests,
even as local and regional factors have gained greater
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saliency in the foreign relations of both Koreas in the
post–Cold War era.
Both despite and in conjunction with the North
Korean mantra decrying U.S. imperialism, the United
States has become central in Pyongyang’s strategic
thinking and behavior, alternately seen as a mortal
threat or an external life support system, and sometimes as both. With the demise of the Soviet Union,
uncertain aid from China, and increasingly close PRC–
ROK relations, the United States has become, for want
of anything better, the functional equivalent of China
and the Soviet Union in Pyongyang’s perspective, at
least until recently. However, whereas the DPRK’s
specialty during the Cold War was playing its allies
Moscow and Beijing off against each other to reap
economic, technical, and military aid, now it must
seek to achieve the same aid—and also international
legitimacy, investment, and trade—from a single
adversary that is increasingly inclined to use force
rather than favor.80
The Long Road to Normalization. By the end of the
Cold War, the United States had a working relationship
with China. The second term of Bill Clinton’s
presidency would bring about rapprochement with
Vietnam, 2 decades after the end of the U.S. conflict
with that country. Few, however, predicted a quick
normalization of relations with North Korea in the
post–Cold War years. The intensity of the Stalinist
state’s political position made such an outcome seem
unlikely; after all, Pyongyang rhetorically disparaged
“cross-recognition” of the two Koreas as a move toward
perpetual division of the peninsula. Furthermore, the
predictions of Pyongyang’s probable collapse made
a pursuit of normalization seem like a waste of time.
Nonetheless, by the late 1990s, as Clinton was preparing
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to leave office, normalization seemed to be on the table,
though events during the Bush administration have
been far less encouraging.
In the early 21st century, the U.S.-DPRK relationship
is one of a kind. With the fall of the Soviet Union,
North Korea is the longest-running political, military,
and ideological adversary for the United States, and
vice versa. Few other bilateral relationships in modern
international relations approach this 60-year history of
mutual enmity and provocation fueled and sustained
by seemingly immutable antagonistic identities.
From the end of Korean War hostilities in 1953 until
the late 1980s, there was no formal diplomatic contact of
any kind between the United States and the DPRK. With
the winding down of the Cold War and the consequent
strategic transformation taking place throughout the
world, the Reagan administration launched what
was termed a “modest initiative” to start a dialogue
with North Korea. Recognizing that Pyongyang’s
increasing isolation was a dangerously destabilizing
factor in Northeast Asia, Reagan authorized the State
Department in the fall of 1988 to hold substantive
discussions with North Korean representatives in
neutral settings and allowed nongovernmental visits
from North Koreans in academics, culture, sports, and
a few other areas. He also ended the almost-total U.S.
ban on commercial and financial transactions with
North Korea by allowing certain exports on a case-bycase basis.81 The George H. W. Bush administration,
however, did not continue the initiative.
Then on March 11, 1993, the DPRK issued the 90day legal notice that it was withdrawing from the NPT,
which it had signed in December 1985. The withdrawal
was a response to the demand by the IAEA—backed
by the threat of an application for UN sanctions—for
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special inspections permitting unlimited access at
any time or place (the first such request ever made
by the IAEA). The announcement of withdrawal
created an instant atmosphere of crisis in Seoul,
Tokyo, Washington, Vienna, and New York, while 149
countries “issued statements denouncing Pyongyang’s
intended withdrawal.”82
Despite the prior U.S. agreement on the principle of
supplying North Korea with two light-water reactors
(LWRs), the agreement stalled in the hammering out
of details, dragging on for almost a year. In May 1994
Pyongyang began removing nuclear fuel rods from
the Yongbyon reactor without the presence of IAEA
inspectors. As the matter came before the UNSC, the
DPRK declared that “U.N. sanctions will be regarded
immediately as a declaration of war,”83 though Jimmy
Carter subsequently received Kim Il Sung’s personal
pledge to freeze the DPRK’s nuclear program.
Somewhat embarrassed, the Clinton administration
had no choice but to negotiate with Pyongyang,
and it began a 4-month process that led to a written
agreement, officially known as the U.S.-DPRK Agreed
Framework. Although some hardline opponents of
this North Korean policy cried “appeasement,” the fact
is that in the absence of the Agreed Framework, North
Korea might today have 50 to 100 nuclear weapons,
rather than 1 or 2 or possibly 6 to 8.84
The Agreed Framework realized in October 1994
inaugurated a period of limited engagement between
the United States and the DPRK. As a putative solution
to the North Korean nuclear issue, the document called
on the United States and North Korea to implement
four conditions. To deal with the energy crisis in
North Korea, the United States was to facilitate the
construction of two LWRs, with the first one scheduled

57

for completion by 2003, in exchange for a written
agreement with the DPRK on the peaceful use of nuclear
energy. Also, the DPRK was to freeze and dismantle
the graphite-moderated reactors under construction.
In addition, the United States would ensure the supply
of heavy fuel oil at a rate of 500,000 tons annually. The
United States also pledged that it would not use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against North Korea
(i.e., negative security), and the DPRK was expected
to engage in dialogue with the ROK. In the pursuit of
effective international regimes, the DPRK was to come
into compliance with the NPT and the requirements
of the IAEA. Finally, the two countries were to move
toward full normalization of political and economic
relations, beginning with reduced barriers to trade
and investment within 3 months of the signing of the
Agreed Framework.
Pyongyang was very positive in its assessment of the
document. North Korea’s chief negotiator, Kang Sok Ju,
described it as “a very important milestone document
of historical significance” that would resolve the
nuclear dispute with finality. The official news media
in the DPRK called the accord “the biggest diplomatic
victory” and went to great lengths to describe it as
an end achieved by the DPRK on its own—that is,
without pressure or assistance from China: “We held
the talks independently with the United States on an
independent footing, not relying on someone else’s
sympathy or advice, and the adoption of the DPRKU.S. agreed framework is a fruition of our independent
foreign policy.”85
The Agreed Framework, therefore, served as a
roadmap for moving U.S.-DPRK relations toward
normalization, starting with the establishment of
liaison offices in Pyongyang and Washington (similar
to the pathway that Sino–American rapprochement
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took to full normalization), but because of half-hearted
implementation of the agreement on the part of the
United States, very little progress was made. The lack
of seriousness with which the United States would
treat the Agreed Framework was made evident when
the U.S. General Accounting Office stated that the
Agreed Framework should properly be described as
“a nonbinding political agreement” or “nonbinding
international agreement” rather than an internationally
binding legal document.86 North Korea, of course, had
anticipated that the signed agreement would be treated
as a legally binding treaty and has since perceived itself
as suffering from a double standard of expectations
regarding implementation.
The Taepodong-I missile test in August 1998 and
the suspicions about the restarting of plutonium
processing were accompanied by North Korean
rumblings about abandoning the Agreed Framework.
In response, Clinton instructed his former Secretary
of Defense, William Perry, to conduct a thorough
review and assessment of U.S. policy toward North
Korea. The Perry process marked the beginning of
a sustained effort at the highest levels of the Clinton
administration to achieve a breakthrough in relations
with North Korea. The Perry Report, issued in October
1999, notes the centrality of the Agreed Framework
and calls for a two-track approach of step-by-step
comprehensive engagement and normalization along
with a concurrent posture of deterrence. The report
also divulges that during the process of exploring
policy options, a policy of regime change and demise,
that is, ”a policy of undermining the DPRK, seeking to
hasten the demise of the regime of Kim Jong Il,” had
been considered and rejected.87
All of this, however, had much to do with
the changing correlation of geostrategic forces
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in the early post–Cold War years. Amid mutual
footdragging Pyongyang began to express its concern openly as the 2003 deadline for the delivery of a
LWR approached. On February 20, 2001, a DPRK
Foreign Ministry spokesman said,
If [the United States] does not honestly implement the
agreed framework, . . . there is no need for us to be bound
to it any longer. We cannot but consider the existence of
the Korean peninsula Energy Development Organization
(KEDO) as meaningless under the present situation
when no one can tell when the LWR project will be
completed.88

On June 18, 2001, the same source warned, “The agreed
framework is in the danger of collapse due to the delay
in the LWR provision.”89 Soon thereafter, the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), produced an
overall shift in U.S. policy from engaging adversaries
to confronting them.
The footdragging over the implementation of the
Agreed Framework was due in part to the expectation—
in Seoul no less than in Tokyo and Washington—
that Pyongyang would collapse before the KEDO
construction program was completed. Yet the delay was
not all on one side, there also being some North Korean
footdragging. Six months were wasted on an “identity
argument” as to what the reactor type was to be called,
and then a labor dispute shut down the construction
until workers from Central Asia were brought in by
KEDO to substitute for the DPRK workforce.
With Bush’s declaration of an “axis of evil” in
January 2002, the administration’s refusal to certify in
March 2002 that the DPRK was acting in accord with
the Agreed Framework (a refusal which threatened
U.S. funding of KEDO), and finally Pyongyang’s
revelations of October 2002 regarding a HEU program,
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Pyongyang and Washington found themselves at
loggerheads. After a long delay, Assistant Secretary of
State James Kelly went to North Korea in early October
2002 for comprehensive policy discussions.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was
announced in May 2003, organized around the
concept of intercepting ships and planes believed to be
carrying illicit weapons material. Then, in the summer
of 2003, what were purported to be details of DoD’s
Korea Plan 5030 were leaked to the press.90 These
strategic documents were an anathema to Pyongyang,
which was closely attuned to developing U.S. policy.
Both DPRK officials and the North Korean media
had long and assiduously followed the U.S. security
policy debate and relevant published documents.
For instance, after the nuclear standoff unfolded in
October 2002, North Korean statements regularly cited
President Bush’s inclusion of the North in the “axis of
evil” and the administration’s preemption doctrine as
virtual declarations of war that justified the DPRK’s
withdrawal from the NPT.91
By the end of the first term of the Bush administration, virtually all former U.S. ambassadors to
the ROK and special envoys to the DPRK (Donald
Gregg, James Laney, Stephen Bosworth, William
Perry, Wendy Sherman, and Charles Kartman) had
criticized the administration’s approach to North
Korea openly. Charles Pritchard, who resigned as the
State Department’s special envoy for North Korean
nuclear issues in August 2003, said, “We’ve gone, under
[Bush’s] watch, from the possibility that North Korea
has one or two weapons to a possibility—a distinct
possibility—that it now has eight or more. And it’s
happened while we were deposing Saddam Hussein
for fear he might get that same capability by the end of
the decade.”92
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If normalization is to come about, security guarantees for North Korea seem to be a necessary if not sufficient condition. The centrality of the DPRK’s survivaldriven security dilemma is evidenced in comments by
Pritchard regarding the 2000 U.S. diplomatic trip to
North Korea:
I am struck by what Kim Jong-il, North Korea’s leader,
said to Madeleine Albright, former US secretary of state,
in October 2000. He told her that in the 1970s, Deng
Xiaoping, the Chinese leader, was able to conclude
that China faced no external security threat and
could accordingly refocus its resources on economic
development. With the appropriate security assurances,
Mr. Kim said, he would be able to convince his military
that the US was no longer a threat and then be in a similar
position to refocus his country’s resources.93

In a 1999 interview, William Perry offered a similar
assessment: “We do not think of ourselves as a threat to
North Korea. But I fully believe that they consider us a
threat to them, and therefore, they see [the Taepodong-I]
missile as a means of deterrence.”94
Without U.S. engagement, North Korea seems
destined to receive neither the international aid that it
needs nor the international recognition that it covets.
More to the point, without engagement the DPRK is
likely to maintain its bunker mentality, as evidenced by
pronouncements such as this one from August 2003:
The Bush administration openly disclosed its attempt to
use nuclear weapons after listing the DPRK as part of “an
axis of evil” and a target of “preemptive nuclear attack.”
This prompted us to judge that the Bush administration
is going to stifle our system by force and decide to
build a strong deterrent force to cope with it. Hence, we
determined to possess that force. . . . It is a means for selfdefense to protect our sovereignty.95
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Security Interaction. After President Bush’s election,
a series of radical shifts in America’s military doctrine
made it increasingly evident that more was going on
than mere rhetorical posturing: the Quadrennial Defense
Review of September 2001 called for a paradigm shift
from threat- to capability-based models; and the Bush
doctrine of preemption, first proclaimed at West Point in
June 2002, was officially enunciated and codified in The
National Security Strategy of the United States of America
in September 2002. The doctrine was implemented in
Iraq in March 2003.
As noted, North Korea pays very close attention
to these public policy pronouncements, and it is not
far-fetched to conclude that the DPRK’s willingness in
October 2002 to confess having a HEU program was
inspired by the bellicosity it found in these official U.S.
policies. While U.S. Secretary of Defense Colin Powell
was saying in June 2002 that the United States would
be ready to meet with the DPRK “any time, any place,
without precondition,” Robert Gallucci, America’s
chief negotiator for the Agreed Framework, claims that
the North Koreans interpreted this as a willingness
on the part of Washington “to meet to accept North
Korean surrender.”96 In fact, as the United States was
moving toward talks with the DPRK, in August 2002
the administration demanded that improvements be
seen in relations between North Korea and Japan. With
the second nuclear standoff, the United States has
declared the Agreed Framework “effectively dead.”97
To resolve the nuclear standoff that began in October
2002, the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a
comprehensive and authoritative statement on October
25, detailing its version of what had actually occurred
in the Kelly–Kang exchanges behind the scenes a few
weeks earlier, and also describing the “grand bargain”
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offered by the North Korean negotiators to U.S.
Assistant Secretary of the State James Kelly:
The DPRK, with greatest magnanimity, clarified that it
was ready to seek a negotiated settlement of this issue
on the following three conditions: firstly, if the U.S.
recognizes the DPRK’s sovereignty; secondly, if it assures
the DPRK of nonaggression; and thirdly, if the U.S. does
not hinder the economic development of the DPRK. . . .
If the U.S. legally assures the DPRK of nonaggression,
including the nonuse of nuclear weapons against it by
concluding . . . a treaty, the DPRK will be ready to clear
the former of its security concerns.98

There were no explicit calls for financial compensation
from the United States. Subsequent North Korean
pronouncements essentially adhered to the proposals
outlined in the October 25 statement.
At the first round of the Six Party talks in Beijing
in August 2003, the DPRK offered a “package
solution” deal. The DPRK offered to revive the Agreed
Framework—without specifically referring to it as
such—and to include a missile deal in exchange for the
establishment of diplomatic relations with the United
States and Japan, along with guarantees of economic
cooperation between the DPRK and Japan and between
the DPRK and the ROK. Pyongyang suggested that the
dismantling of its nuclear program was contingent
on a lessening of U.S. hostility, that a nonaggression
treaty was the benchmark of this lessening of hostility,
that such a treaty must be of binding legal force, and
that action must be taken simultaneously—”word for
word, action for action.”99 The North Koreans claimed
that China, Russia, and South Korea were open to the
package solution, whereas Japan and the United States
remained focused on their own individual objectives.
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To solve the nuclear standoff by taking account of
North Korea’s security concerns, the United States did
explore the possibility of a multilateral security pact.
Powell said in October 2003, “It would be something
that would be public, something that would be written,
something that I hope would be multilateral.”100
Powell’s staff was drafting sample agreements that he
hoped would be acceptable to Pyongyang and would
ease the impasse over its nuclear weapons programs. In
the same month, President Bush indicated for the first
time that the United States would offer a multilateral
security guarantee to be signed by Pyongyang’s
Northeast Asian neighbors and by Washington.
Pyongyang responded quickly with a cautiously
positive reaction. Through its UN mission, North
Korea said, “We are ready to consider Bush’s remarks
on the ‘written assurances of nonaggression’ if they are
based on the intention to coexist with the DPRK and
aimed to play a positive role in realizing the proposal
for a package solution on the principle of simultaneous
actions.”101
In the third round of Six Party talks, held in June
2004, the United States outlined a denuclearization
proposal. This proposal seemed like little more than
a reformulation of the CVID mantra. North Korea
was required to make the initial concessions without
any guarantee of reciprocation from the United
States. Whereas the requirements for the DPRK
were quite specific, those for the United States were
more ambiguous. Pyongyang raised the ante of its
own brinkmanship diplomacy with the February 10,
2005, statement that it had “manufactured nukes for
self-defense to cope with the Bush administration’s
evermore undisguised policy to isolate and stifle the
DPRK,” and that it was therefore “compelled to suspend
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participation in the [Six Party] talks for an indefinite
period.”102 The Western news media jumped on the fact
that the announcement also contained North Korea’s
first public declaration that it had nuclear weapons.
The February 10 statement generated a flurry of
intensive “bi-multilateral” consultations, and China’s
preventive diplomacy with both Koreas reached the
highest levels.
On July 9, 2005, North Korea finally agreed to return
for a fourth round of the Six Party talks later in the
month. Suggesting there was no behind-the-scenes
Chinese pressure, the DPRK showcased this breakthrough as stemming from bilateral “negotiations”
between U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher
Hill (who replaced James Kelly as America’s top
negotiator at the Six Party talks) and Kim Kye Gwan
of the DPRK.103 Tellingly, Kim Kye Gwan conveyed
his government’s definitive and date-specific decision
to return to the Six Party talks in the course of a 3hour dinner meeting with Hill, an event hosted by
the Chinese in Beijing on the eve of a scheduled trip
to Pyongyang by Tang Jiaxuan (state counselor and
former foreign minister) as part of Chinese efforts to
bridge differences between the United States and the
DPRK.
The Bush administration’s sudden escalation
of verbal attacks on North Korea’s long-known
counterfeiting, drug trafficking, and other crimes in
the wake of the September 19, 2006, Joint Statement
of Principles may have caught some observers by
surprise, but it was hardly surprising for many others.
Predictably, the result was to scuttle and replace a new
round of the Six Party talks with another round of the
Washington-Pyongyang war of words, as Washington
and Pyongyang unleashed verbal attacks on each
other over activities outside the scope of the Six Party
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negotiations. North Korea’s human rights abuses and
criminal activities have been known for years, and yet
Washington has dealt with these issues apart from the
Six Party talks because it always considered ending
North Korea’s nuclear program to be its highest policy
priority. By the end of 2005, even further delay appeared
possible in negotiating implementation of the Joint
Statement of Principles to eliminate Pyongyang’s nuclear
program through a “words for words” and “action for
action” process stipulated in the document.104
More to the point, however, both Pyongyang and
Washington showed little trust toward each other.
“While in Washington the North Korean nuclear threat
has been a major issue for the past decade,” as Gavan
McCormack reminds us, “in Pyongyang the U.S. nuclear
threat has been the issue for the past 50 years. North
Korea’s uniqueness in the nuclear age lies first of all
in the way it has faced and lived under the shadow of
nuclear threat for longer than any other nation.”105 With
the coming of the Bush administration, Pyongyang has
had even more reason to distrust Washington, given
the way the United States first appropriated North
Korean national identity by making it a charter member
of the “axis of evil” and then pursued a hardline policy
(although this has proceeded in fits and starts due in
no small measure to America’s ongoing challenges in
Iraq, the first test case of the Bush doctrine for the three
charter members of the “axis of evil”).
Economic Interaction. Following North Korea’s
invasion of the South in June 1950, the United States
imposed a nearly complete economic embargo on
the DPRK. During the next 4 decades, the scope and
specificity of U.S. sanctions steadily expanded. Article
II of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework of 1994 stated,
“Within 3 months of the day of this Document, both
sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment,
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including restrictions on telecommunications services,
and financial transactions.” In March 1995, the U.S.
Department of Commerce approved the sale of 55,000
tons of corn to North Korea by a U.S. grain dealer,
opening the door to U.S. exports to the DPRK. In the mid1990s, Washington approved a number of transactions
on a case-by-case basis, including telecommunications
link-ups, tourist excursions, airline overflight payments, purchases of North Korean magnesite, and
a grain-for-zinc barter deal.106 Finally, in September
1999, almost 50 years after the initial export embargo,
President Bill Clinton announced that the United States
would ease economic sanctions against North Korea
affecting most trade and travel, thereby ending the
longest-standing trade embargo in U.S. history. Many
items that had previously required a license were now
eligible for export without a license; certain items on
the Commerce Control List (CCL) moved from a policy
of denial status to case-by-case review.
Today, trade and related transactions generally are
allowed for non–dual-use goods (dual-use goods are
those that may have both civilian and military uses) if
a set of overarching conditions is met. To lift all export
controls applied to North Korea, Pyongyang first
would have to be removed from the State Department
list of countries supporting acts of international
terrorism. The United States also cannot extend
Normal Trade Relations status—formerly called MostFavored Nation status—to North Korea because of
the restrictions included in the 1951 Trade Agreement
Extension Act that prohibited extending such status to
communist states. Pursuant to the Trade Act of 1974,
this lack of status also excludes the DPRK from the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). U.S. citizens
may, however, travel to North Korea, and there are no
restrictions on the amount of money one may spend in
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transit or while there. Assets frozen prior to June 19,
2000, remain frozen.
Despite the easing of most trade restrictions, trade
and investment between North Korea and the United
States has remained virtually nonexistent and also
highly politicized. As shown in Table 4, U.S.-DPRK
trade is almost entirely in one direction: the United
States exports moderate amounts of mostly agricultural
goods to North Korea and imports virtually nothing
from the DPRK. South Korea’s trade with the United
States in a single day in 2005 ($196 million) is almost
two times greater than the combined total of North
Korea’s trade with the United States in the 16-year
period 1990-2005 ($100 million). America’s economic
sanctions have certainly denied Pyongyang access to
the world’s largest market, but North Korea has met
with only limited success in selling its products in
other markets where no sanctions existed.
The history of U.S.-Korean relations—especially
U.S.-DPRK relations, from the General Sherman
incident to the recent standoffs over North Korea’s
nuclear pursuits—teaches us that the conflict between
the United States and North Korea often goes beyond
considerations of power. The U.S.-DPRK conflict has
deep historical roots born in war and perpetuated
for more than half a century. The present conflict is
not simply about nuclear weapons but rather about
competing worldviews and perceptions of self and
others. Rhetorically, it is as much about putative good
and evil as about international security. The war on
terror that has followed from the 9/11 attacks has
involved a Manichean lens in which states are either
with the United States or against it. Because of the
history of conflict, the DPRK automatically made the
“against the United States” list.
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Exports
Year to North
Korea
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

0.03
0.1
0.1
2.0
0.2
11.6
0.5
2.5
4.4
11.3
2.7
0.5
25.1
8.0
23.8
5.8

Imports
Total
U.S. Trade
Percent Change
from
North
Balance
in North KoreanNorth
Korean- with North
U.S. Trade
Korea U.S. Trade
Korea
0.0
0.03
0.03
N/A
0.1
0.2
0
+567%
0.0
0.1
0.1
-50%
0.0
2.0
2.0
+1900%
0.0
0.2
0.2
-90%
0.0
11.6
11.6
+5700%
0.0
0.5
0.5
-96%
0.0
2.5
2.5
+400%
0.0
4.4
4.4
+76%
0.0
11.3
11.3
+157%
0.1
2.8
2.6
-75%
0.0
0.5
0.5
-82%
0.1
25.2
25.0
+4940%
0.0
8.0
8.0
-68%
1.5
25.3
22.3
+216%
0.0
5.8
5.8
-77%

Sources: International Monetary Fund 1992, p. 247; 1993, p. 247;
1994, p. 265; 1995, p. 269; 1996, p. 275; 1997, p. 347; 1998, p. 280;
MOFAT, 1998, pp. 396,401; 1999, pp. 481, 486; 2001, p. 497; available
at www.mofat.go.kr/; KOTRA at www.kotra.or.kr; United States
Department of Commerce; International Trade Administration at
www.ita.doc.gov.

Table 4. U.S. Trade with North Korea, 1990-2005
(Units: U.S.$1 million).
In effect, there is a resurgence of national identity at
the nation-state level, and the divided nation-state of
Korea is watching its two halves officially move closer
to one another, while the United States remains a target
for both appeals and scorn from both of those halves, to
greater and lesser degrees. The United States now risks
provoking negative responses from both Korean states
if it pursues the wrong path, and it risks losing its place
on the Korean peninsula if it is not proactive enough.
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Not since the North Korean invasion of South Korea
in 1950 after U.S. troops had left the peninsula has
the question of the U.S. future on the peninsula been
subject to so many possibilities and contingencies.
Inter-Korean Relations.
For nearly 2 decades after the “end” of the Korean
War, the two Korean states talked about and sometimes
acted out their competing unification visions only
in the context of the overthrow or replacement of
one national identity by the other. After the shock of
President Nixon’s visit to China in the early 1970s, interKorean relations developed in fits and starts, mutating
through four cycles of dialogue and reconciliation.107
The first cycle, beginning in August 1971, entailed a
series of seven Red Cross talks held alternately in
Pyongyang and Seoul over 2 years, culminating in
a joint communiqué in which both Koreas agreed
to uphold three principles: (1) unification achieved
through independent efforts; (2) unification achieved
through peaceful means; and (3) national unity sought
by transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and
systems.
The second cycle of talks, running from September
1984 through February 1986, involved a flurry of
contacts and exchanges in various functional and
humanitarian fields; these talks reaffirmed the three
principles of unification. The third cycle, which began
in 1990 and was inspired in part by changes in global
politics linked with the end of the Cold War, was more
promising than the first two. It jump-started interKorean trade, eased the entry of the two Koreas into
the UN as two separate but equal member states, and
led to the drafting of two documents: the North–South
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Basic Agreement (officially known as “Agreement on
Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and
Cooperation between the South and the North”) and
the “Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula.”
With Kim Dae Jung’s inauguration as ROK president
in February 1998, South Korea initiated the Sunshine
Policy of opening to North Korea with a pledge not to
undermine or absorb the DPRK. The new policy was
based in part on explicit recognition that undermining
the DPRK is simply not a viable policy option because
of the disorder and destruction that would follow
from a Northern collapse.108 President Kim Dae Jung’s
repeated pledges that the South has no intent “to
undermine or absorb North Korea,” thus speaking to
one of the key remaining fears in Pyongyang, stand out
as one of the most significant steps toward accepting
identity difference as an integral part of the gradual
peace process.109
The Sunshine Policy created the appropriate
conditions—both in South Korea and in North Korea—
for the historic inter-Korean summit of June 13–15,
2000, which catalyzed the fourth and most promising
cycle—indeed, a turning point—of inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation. Without a doubt, the chief
catalyst for the Pyongyang summit was President Kim
Dae Jung’s consistent and single-minded pursuit of his
pro-engagement Sunshine Policy. More than anything
else, the offer of substantial if unspecified governmental
aid to refurbish North Korea’s decrepit infrastructure
was an important causal force behind Kim Jong
Il’s decision to agree to the summit. Until Kim Dae
Jung’s Berlin Declaration in March 2000 offering aid
to the DPRK,110 Pyongyang had taken a two-handed
approach, attacking the Sunshine Policy as a “sunburn
policy” on ideological grounds while simultaneously
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pursuing a mendicant strategy to extract maximum
economic concessions. Before the official unveiling of
the statement in Berlin, Seoul delivered an advance
text to Pyongyang, Beijing, Moscow, Tokyo, and
Washington, demonstrating that the Big Four had little
to do with the initiation of the summit.
The 2000 Pyongyang summit was most remarkable
historically because it was initiated and executed by
Koreans themselves with no external shock or greatpower sponsorship. The previous inter-Korean accords
had been responses to major changes external to the
Korean peninsula, such as the 1972 joint communiqué
after Nixon’s visit to China or the 1992 agreements
following the demise of the Cold War. The Pyongyang
summit, the first of its kind in the half-century history of
politics of competitive legitimation and delegitimation
on the divided peninsula, generated opportunities
and challenges for the Big Four as they stepped back
to reassess the likely future of inter-Korean affairs
and the implications for their own national interests.
The dramatic summit also led to some paradoxical
expectations and consequences.
Suddenly, at least from June to November of 2000,
the capital city of Pyongyang, the city of darkness,
became a city of diplomatic light and a primary arena
for diplomatic influence and competition among the
Big Four as inter-Korean relations returned to a more
international field. The notion that the Pyongyang
summit had improved prospects for melting the
remnant Cold War glacier on the Korean peninsula
seemed to have intensified the needs and efforts of the
Big Four to readjust their respective Korea policies in
response to rapidly changing realities on the ground.
The North Koreans viewed and framed the summit,
although native in origin, as a major concession to the
United States and as a concrete step taken by the DPRK
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to fulfill one of the obligations in the 1994 Agreed
Framework.111 The United States was then expected
to make major economic and strategic concessions.
Pyongyang did its best to exploit the new connection
with Seoul in order to speed up normalization talks
with the United States and to gain access to bilateral
and multilateral aid and foreign direct investment.
In addition to the summit with Kim Dae Jung, the
infamously reclusive Kim Jong Il also met first with
Chinese President Jiang Zemin in a secret visit to
Beijing in May 2000 and then with Russian President
Vladimir Putin that July, after which he received a
flurry of diplomatic missions to Pyongyang, including
U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Chinese
Defense Minister Chi Haotian, and a European Union
(EU) delegation. By early 2001, however, Pyongyang’s
high hopes and expectations from the “Clinton in
Pyongyang Shock” turned into the “Bush in Washington Shock,” with low and ever-diminishing returns.
Furthermore, while the Joint Declaration speaks
of economic cooperation and indeed has fostered
significant growth in that area, it failed to address
military and security matters, lacking even a general
statement about working together for tension reduction
and confidence-building. Pyongyang clearly desired
to discuss security issues only with the United States.
Tellingly, Pyongyang has held the administration in
Washington hostage to the resumption of inter-Korean
dialogue, at least from January 2001 to August 2002,
breaching not only the letter and the spirit of the NorthSouth Joint Declaration but also its own longstanding
party line that Korean affairs should be handled
without foreign intervention or interference.
But the significance of the summit should not be
underrated. It was all about mutual recognition and
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legitimation, and it succeeded in no small measure
in finally bringing the two Koreas down from their
hegemonic-unification dreamlands to acceptance of
peaceful coexistence as two separate states. The single
greatest accomplishment of the summit was to deliver
a major blow to the fratricidal politics of competitive
legitimation and delegitimation. Although the two
Kims symbolically signaled their acceptance of each
other’s legitimacy through their actions at the summit,
neither of them enunciated a belief that reunification
would be coming in the near future. Kim Dae Jung,
in fact, predicted that it would take 20 to 30 years
for the divided Korean peninsula to achieve national
unification, even as North Korea declared for the first
time to the domestic audience that “the issue of unifying
the differing systems in the North and the South as one
may be left to posterity to settle slowly in the future.”112
The Joint Declaration produced by the summit,
while initially limited in domain, adopted a functional
“peace by pieces” approach to the Korean conflict.113
In effect, economic relations were anointed as the
practical pathway for the gradual development and
institutionalization of a working peace mechanism for
the two Koreas. The fourth article of the document used
the term “national economy,” apparently assuming
an eventual integration of North and South Korean
economies.114 It is worth noting in this connection that
for the period from July 1972 to August 2005, covering
all four cycles of dialogue and cooperation, 47 interKorean agreements were signed, breaking down as
follows: one during the first cycle; none during the
second cycle; 13 during the third cycle (December 1991–
July 1994); and 33 during the fourth cycle (April 2000–
August 2005). Inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation
came to a halt during the first 20 months of the Bush
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administration (from January 2001 to August 2002)—
not a single inter-Korean accord was signed—but
Pyongyang returned to inter-Korean dialogue in late
August 2002, signing no less than six accords through
the end of 2003.115
Almost in tandem with the simmering U.S.DPRK nuclear standoff and the coming of the Roh
Moo-hyun government, both the speed and scope of
inter-Korean talks and cooperation have accelerated,
and nearly 100 rounds of official government-level
meetings have been held since the inauguration of
the “Policy of Peace and Prosperity” by the Roh
administration in February 2003. Of course, the second
U.S.-DPRK nuclear standoff could overshadow but
not reverse some remarkable achievements in interKorean relations in all issue areas from August 2002
to mid-2006. With the election in December 2002 of
Roh Moo-hyun, an offspring candidate of the “386
generation,” North Korea finds “its most cooperative
South Korean government ever. . . . Roh emphasized
even more strongly than his predecessor that interKorean economic cooperation would continue and
that dialogue and economic inducements were the
best means to bring about positive change in North
Korea’s behavior.”116 Pyongyang’s view of the state
of inter-Korean relations also has evolved to such an
extent that it could confidently declare in its Joint New
Year (2003) Editorial: “It can be said that there exists
on the Korean Peninsula at present only confrontation
between the Koreans in the North and the South and
the United States.”117
As shown in Table 5, inter-Korean trade registered
a 5.2 percent decline from 2000 to 2001 but recorded
a huge 59.3 percent increase from 2001 to 2002 and
another impressive 51.5 percent increase from 2004
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to 2005. In 2005 inter-Korean trade topped $1 billion
for the first time, sufficing to make Seoul Pyongyang’s
second largest trade partner after China. In fact, since
2002, South Korea has become and has remained the
North’s second largest trading partner, surging ahead
of Japan. Inter-Korean trade now constitutes 26 percent
of North Korea’s total foreign trade (but alas, only 0.19
percent of South Korea’s total foreign trade).
Year
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

Imports
Exports
%
%
Total
%
from North
to North
Change
Change
trade
change
Korea
Korea
18,655
69
18,724
12,278
-34.2
1,188 1,621.7
13,466
-28.1
105,719
761.0
5,547 366.9 111,266
726.3
162,863
54.1
10,563
90.4 173,426
55.9
178,167
9.4
8,425
-20.2 186,592
7.6
176,298
-1.0
18,249
116.6 194,547
4.3
222,855
26.4
64,436 253.1 287,291
47.7
182,400
-18.2
69,639
8.1 252,039
-12.3
193,069
5.8 115,270
65.5 308,339
22.3
92,264
-52.2 129,679
12.5 221,943
-28.0
121,604
31.8 211,832
63.4 333,437
50.2
152,373
25.3 272,775
28.8 425,148
27.5
176,170
15.6 226,787
-16.9 402,957
-5.2
271,575
54.2 370,155
63.2 641,730
59.3
289,252
6.5 434,965
17.5 724,217
12.9
258,039
-10.8 439,001
0.9 697,040
-3.8
340,281
31.0 715,472
63.0 1,055,753
51.5

Note: These figures include both transactional and nontransactional (i.e., noncommercial) trade.
Sources: KOTRA at www.kotra.go.kr; ROK Ministry of Unification.

Table 5. South Korean–North Korean Trade,
1989–2005 (Unit: U.S.$1,000).
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Trade with South Korea is in general de facto
economic aid for North Korea, and the ROK has
become one of the major sources of hard currency in
the DPRK.118 Beginning in the early 1990s with small
exchanges of goods, trade, which was essentially the
functional cornerstone of Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine
Policy, has continued despite nuclear tensions. Over
the course of Kim Dae Jung’s and Roh Moo-hyun’s
presidencies, inter-Korean trade registered a nearly
five-fold increase from $221 million in 1998 to $1,055
million in 2005.
One of the key components of this trade is
processing-on-commission (POC) trade, in which South
Korean companies export raw materials to the DPRK
and then import finished or semifinished products.
This type of trade involves the creation of new jobs in
North Korea, some degree of technology transfer, a
fair amount of investment in the North from the South,
and, most importantly, direct contact between North
and South Koreans. Many of the POC plants that have
been established use South Korean machinery and
supervisors. By 2003, South Korean companies were
making shoes, beds, television sets, and men’s suits in
the North.119
In addition, since the mid-1990s, Seoul has
increased its flows of “nontransactional” trade, which
is the exchange of noncommercial goods, such as those
used in the now defunct KEDO reactor projects or for
humanitarian aid. Nontransactional trade began in
1995 and has increased to such a degree that it is about
40 percent of total inter-Korean trade on the average.
Overall, these increased trading relations are part of a
program led by the ROK but accepted by the DPRK to
create functional linkages between North and South in
the interest of managing conflict, maintaining peace,
and catalyzing eventual reunification.120
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Although trade may be growing and increasingly
impressive, it is investment that will make the most
difference for the North Korean economy and for
economic relations in the interests of fostering peace on
the peninsula.121 Despite the self-reliant juche philosophy that undergirds the DPRK’s national identity,
the newly-minted Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC)
in North Korea already has attracted attention from
a number of small- and medium-size companies in
South Korea. The reconnection of roads and railways
between the two countries—what President Kim
Dae Jung characterized as de facto unification—will
reduce the transaction costs of trade and embed both
countries in a larger Northeast Asian trading system.
Pyongyang has recognized the essential need to open
itself to foreign economic agents and has undertaken
legal reform to encourage investment and trade. South
Korea is the most likely source of the funding that can
revitalize or at least stabilize the DPRK’s economy.
What many realists dismissed as beyond the realm
of possibility only a few years ago is now happening,
as raw materials and finished products are passing
along and through what was once considered a major
invasion route.122 This “peace by pieces” functional
cooperation provides ways of living with identity
differences on the divided Korean peninsula rather
than fighting about them.
In addition, cultural and social exchanges, though
not as revolutionary as some had hoped, have
continued unabated. Since its opening in November
1998, the Mt. Kumgang project has increased the
number of South Koreans who travel to the North.
With the reestablishment of road and rail links between
the two Koreas, along with the demining of areas of
the DMZ around these links, South Korean tour buses
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made the first overland tours to Mt. Kumgang in
North Korea in over 50 years, and the South Korean
conglomerate Hyundai continued work on industrial
plants in Kaesong in the North. Civilian exchanges and
cooperation are surging substantially as well. In 2005
alone, the number of people who traveled between
the two Koreas reached 88,341, surpassing the total
number of people exchanges for the past 60 years.
The normative and functional spillovers from
growing inter-Korean dialogue and reconciliation
can be seen in several noneconomic domains. After
more than half a century of politics of competitive
legitimation and delegitimation, the leaders of the proSeoul Korean Residents Union in Japan (Mindan) and
the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean
Residents in Japan (Chongryun) met for the first time on
May 17, 2006. They issued a joint statement pledging to
turn their longstanding antagonism into reconcilation
and cooperation. The joint statement was influenced
greatly by the declared intentions of their respective
“home states,” being based largely on the North-South
Joint Declaration of June 15, 2000. Even in the military/
security domain, rare talks between North and South
Korean generals in 2004 (the first of their kind) made
progress on the establishment of naval radio contact to
prevent firefights like those of 1999 and 2002 and also
on the discontinuation of propaganda activities against
each other along the 155-mile-long DMZ. As noted
earlier, the convergence of the positions of Chinese and
the two Koreas in the fourth round of Six Party talks
is a remarkable event defying the conventional realist
wisdom. Thus in a series of accords and agreements
reached over the years, especially from 2000 to 2006, the
relationship between North and South Korea has come
quite close to that of mutually recognized sovereign
states.
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EXPLAINING NORTH KOREA’S SECURITYCUM-SURVIVAL STRATEGY
As is amply made manifest in U.S.-DPRK nuclear
confrontations and negotiations—and Pyongyang’s
“package solution” proposal—there remains the
inseparable linkage of security, development, and
legitimacy in the conduct of North Korean foreign
policy. Indeed, three types of crisis—security crisis,
economic crisis, and legitimation crisis—all frame and
drive North Korea’s security-cum-survival strategy in
the post–Kim Il Sung era.
The Quest for Security.
During the Cold War, Pyongyang’s main security
concern was not so much to balance against or
bandwagon with the United States as in coping with
the twin security dilemmas of allied abandonment
and allied entrapment. Ironically, it was the SinoSoviet conflict, not the U.S.-Soviet tensions, that most
enhanced “the power of the weak.” In its security
behavior, Pyongyang demonstrated a remarkable
unilateral zigzag balancing strategy in its relations
with Moscow and Beijing, taking sides if necessary on
particular issues, while attempting at the same time to
extract maximum payoffs in economic, technical, and
military aid, but never completely casting its lot with
one or the other.
How can we then explain the paradox of the survival
of post–Kim Il Sung North Korea in the post–Cold
War era? The literature on asymmetric conflicts shows
that weaker powers have engaged in wars against
stronger adversaries more often than not, and big
powers frequently lose wars in asymmetric conflicts
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(e.g., the Vietnam War).123 According to a recent study,
weak states were victorious in nearly 30 percent of all
asymmetric wars in the approximately 200-year period
covered in the Correlates of War data set. More tellingly,
weak states have won with increasing frequency as
the modern era approached.124 Weaker states also
have initiated many brinkmanship crises that fell short
of war, a strategy that North Korea has employed
repeatedly.125
A consideration of multiple and mutually
interactive influences can help us answer the puzzle
of Pyongyang’s uncanny resilience and “the power
of the weak” in the context of the DPRK-U.S. nuclear
confrontation. Drawing theoretical insight from
asymmetric conflict and negotiation theory, we may
postulate that the power balance in an issue-specific
relationship and the performance of the weaker state
are affected by four key variables: the weak state’s
proximity to the strategic field of play; the availability
to the stronger state of feasible alternatives; the stakes
involved for both states in conflict and the degree of
their resolve; and the degree of control for all involved
parties.126
As a weaker state in conflict with a superpower
and its allies (South Korea and Japan), North Korea has
relied upon issue-specific and situation-specific power,
the effectiveness and credibility of which has required
resources other than the traditional elements of national
power. North Korea’s proximity to the strategic field
of play, its compensating brinkmanship strategy, the
high stakes involved, and its governmental resolve
and control have all reinforced one another to make
a strong actor’s aggregate conventional power largely
less relevant. North Korea has adopted a wide range
of tactics in and out of the asymmetric conflict and
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negotiation processes in order to reduce the opponent’s
alternatives and weaken the opponent’s resolve and
control.
The geographical position of the DPRK is one of the
most compelling and immutable factors in Pyongyang’s
survival strategy. Since countries can change their
leaders, systems, policies, and strategies but cannot
change their location, “geography or geopolitics has
long been the point of departure for studies of foreign
policy or world politics.”127 Surrounded by all four
major powers and its southern rival, North Korea’s
home turf is the strategic field of play from which it
exercises its brinkmanship or plays its collapse card.
Contrary to the conventional realist wisdom, in
asymmetrical conflict and negotiations the strong state
does not ipso facto exert greater control than the weak
state. If a smaller and weaker state occupies territory
of strategic importance to a larger and stronger state,
or if the field of play is on the weak actor’s home turf
(as was the case in the U.S.-Panama negotiations and
British-Iceland Cod Wars), the weaker state can deploy
bargaining clout disproportionate to its intrinsic
coercive potential.128
The ineluctable fact that North Korea is at the center
of the strategic crossroads of Northeast Asia where the
Big Four uneasily meet and interact has served rather
well in bolstering Pyongyang’s control. By dint of its
proximity to what Peter Hayes called “the fuse on the
nuclear powder keg in the Pacific,”129 Pyongyang has
leveled the field of play so as to wield greater control
than the United States by constantly changing the
rules of entry and the rules of play in the pursuit of its
preferred outcome. North Korea’s manifest preference
for direct bilateral negotiations with the United States
also is a way of seeking the home court advantage to
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maximize its control in the asymmetric conflict and
negotiation process.
Consider as well how Pyongyang’s geographical
position, combined with its military of 1.2 million
members and its asymmetric military capabilities,
provides ample fodder for its survival-driven leverage
diplomacy with South Korea and the United States.
Some 70 percent of its active force—700,000 troops,
8,000 artillery systems, and 2,000 tanks—are forwarddeployed near the DMZ. Seoul, where one-fourth of
South Korea’s 49 million people live and where nearly
75 percent of the country’s wealth is concentrated, is
only 40 kilometers (25 miles) from the DMZ and thus
within easy reach of North Korean jet fighters, armored
vehicles, Scud missiles, and artillery guns. Within
minutes, Pyongyang could turn Seoul into “a sea of
fire,” as it threatened to do in the heat of the first nuclear
crisis of mid-1994. Any ultimate Allied triumph would
be a Pyrrhic victory since such devastation would be
crippling to South Korea.130
Without launching such an armed invasion,
Pyongyang could still exercise its “negative power”
or even play its collapse card to spawn instability on
the divided Korean peninsula. One of the underlying
rationales for the inauguration of the Kim Dae Jung
administration’s “sunshine policy” was that potential
implosion or explosion in the North would put at risk
South Korea’s recovery from the 1997–98 financial crisis
by discouraging foreign direct investment inflows. The
financial crisis served as a wake-up call regarding the
consequences of North Korea’s prospective collapse.
Hence, to deter or delay the economic effects of a
North Korean hard landing as long as possible, the
sunshine policy became South Korea’s default policy.131
In March 2005 President Roh Moo-hyun publicly
declared, “We will not be embroiled in any [armed]
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conflict in Northeast Asia against our will. This is an
absolutely firm principle we cannot yield under any
circumstances.”132
North Korea’s geographical location is also of
considerable strategic concern to NEA’s Big Four.
Located at the pivot point of the NEA security complex
and at the most important strategic nexus of the AsiaPacific region, Pyongyang is capable, by hostility or
instability, of entrapping any or all of the Big Four in
a stairstep of conflict escalation these governments
would rather avoid. If Pyongyang’s brinkmanship or
Washington’s sanctions or regime-change strategy
escalate to war, the cost to all parties would be
exorbitant.
Concomitant to Pyongyang’s survival strategy are
the limitations of Washington’s issue-specific power
to pressure Pyongyang and the lack of palatable
alternatives to negotiation. The twisted logic of a selfstyled juche kingdom is that it is not as vulnerable
as a normal state to public shaming and the various
sanction tools of traditional statecraft. The acceptable
nonnegotiation alternatives available to the United
States in the resolution of the North Korean nuclear
and missile issues have remained severely limited.
The credible threats of surgical military strikes and
enforceable economic sanctions against Pyongyang
were considered but rejected because of the Pentagon’s
objections, Seoul’s vulnerability, China’s veto threat,
and even Tokyo’s reluctance. William Perry—reflecting
on his involvement in the emergency national security
meeting of June 16, 1994, regarding the most serious
North Korean nuclear brinkmanship crisis of his tenure
as Secretary of Defense—writes about a third-way
option for a negotiated deal in the face of the extremely
limited alternatives available to U.S. policymakers:
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“We were about to give the president a [third-way]
choice between a disastrous option—allowing North
Korea to get a nuclear arsenal, which we might have
to face someday—and an unpalatable option, blocking
this development, but thereby risking a destructive
nonnuclear war.”133 Given all the constraints on
America’s issue-specific power, the rise of a costaware foreign policy, and the collapse of a bipartisan
foreign policy consensus in the 1990s, the U.S.-DPRK
Agreement of October 21, 1994, could be said to be the
worst deal, except that there was no better alternative.
For Beijing—and to a lesser extent for Seoul, Moscow, and Tokyo—Washington’s sanctions diplomacy in
mid-1994 emerged as a no-win proposition, as it would
bring about the worst of two possible outcomes. It could
be ineffective in controlling nuclear proliferation since
it could only strengthen the determination of the North
Korean leadership to go nuclear, or it could destabilize
a North Korean regime that would then dump many of
its ill-fed, fleeing refugees on China’s northeastern and
Russia’s far eastern provinces. Thus, paradoxically,
Pyongyang’s growing difficulties and threat of collapse
have increased its bargaining leverage relative to its
weak intrinsic power.
Another consideration regarding leverage in
asymmetrical negotiations is the matter of relative and
absolute stakes and resolve. The higher the stakes for
a state actor in the process of bargaining, the more it
is willing to commit its resources and the greater its
resolve to attain a favorable negotiation outcome. The
issue of stakes may have a crucial part in explaining
why the weaker North Vietnam ultimately achieved
victory during the Vietnam War fought on Vietnamese
turf. Similarly, North Korea has been disadvantaged
against the United States in the overall correlation of
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forces, but there also remained a clear asymmetry in
survival stakes and resolve favoring Pyongyang—
to wit, Washington’s apprehensions regarding the
integrity of the NPT regime. Compare America’s
relatively nonchalant reaction to the nuclear breakout
states India and Pakistan with U.S. nervousness in the
face of a Pyongyang bolstered by fear for its survival
and consequent highest possible resolve.
Of course, resolve without capability and willingness to use force is the mark of a paper tiger, and as
such it cannot work in asymmetrical negotiation. With
the end of the Cold War and with Moscow-Seoul
normalization, the nuclear card suddenly became a
very potent lever for North Korea. The DPRK has
striven to use its nuclear weapons program as an allpurpose, cost-effective instrument of foreign policy.
For Pyongyang, the nuclear program is a military
deterrent, an equalizer in national identity competition
with South Korea (which lacks nuclear weapons), a
bargaining chip for extracting economic concessions
from the United States and China, and a cost-effective
insurance policy for regime survival. International
uncertainty surrounding actual nuclear capabilities,
deliberately nurtured by North Korea, has gone a long
way for that small country. It is through the combination
of putative military power and the on-again, off-again
tit-for-tat diplomacy on the part of Pyongyang that it
has gained not only the upper hand over the forces
that seek to crush it, but also economic assistance from
wealthy capitalist countries. All such manna has come
from the abiding fear of war held by those nations that
regard North Korea as an enemy.134
To abandon such a military posture, including its
nuclear capability, would be to leave Pyongyang without the single most important lever in its asymmetric
conflicts and negotiations with South Korea, the United
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States, and Japan. Instead, Pyongyang follows its own
third way—a maxi-mini strategy, doing the minimum
necessary to get the maximum possible aid from
South Korea and other countries without reducing its
minimum deterrent military power.
North Korean nuclear and missile brinkmanship
also illustrates with particular clarity that when the
enactment of a national identity is blocked in one
domain, it seeks to compensate in another. From
Pyongyang’s military-first perspective, developing
asymmetrical capabilities such as ballistic missiles and
WMD serves as strategic sine qua non in its survival
strategy, as well as an equalizer in the legitimacy war
and status competition with the South. It remains
one of the few areas in which the DPRK commands a
comparative advantage in the military balance of power
with the South. North Korea’s humiliating defeat by
its southern counterpart in the first-ever naval clash in
June 1999 further emphasizes its WMD and ballistic
missiles as a strategic equalizer.
In short, Pyongyang’s proximity to the strategic
field of play, its high stakes, resolve, and control,
its relative asymmetrical military capabilities, and
its coercive leverage strategy have all combined to
enable the DPRK to exercise bargaining power far
disproportionate to its aggregate structural power.
That said, however, Kim Jong Il’s pronounced
commitment to survival strategy would not stand in the
way of his demonstrating situation-specific flexibility,
especially in foreign policy. Indeed, Pyongyang has
pursued a great variety of coping strategies, such as
brinkmanship, beggar diplomacy, tit-for-tat cooperative strategy, overseas arms sales, appeals for
humanitarian aid, and on-again, off-again joint-venture
projects, to generate desperately needed foreign
capital.
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The Quest for Development
During the long Cold War years, geopolitics and
ideology combined to make it possible for Pyongyang
to gain significant economic, military, and security
benefits from larger socialist allies, especially Moscow
and Beijing, and to claim thereby that the North Korean
system was a success. In the late 1950s and much of
the 1960s, the political economy of North Korea did
indeed seem headed toward becoming an exceptional
model of an autocentric, socialist, and self-reliant
national economy afloat in the sea of the capitalist
world system.
Determined not to be outperformed in the
legitimation-cum-economic war, in 1972 Pyongyang
launched its first international shopping expeditions
for capital and technology, accumulating in a few
years (1972 to 1975) a trade deficit of about $1.3
billion with non-Communist countries and $700
million with Communist countries. This was the
genesis of Pyongyang’s debt trap.135 Hit by the rapidly
deteriorating terms of trade (the oil crisis and declining
metal prices), Pyongyang defaulted on its debts in 1975,
with the dual consequences of effectively cutting itself
off from Western capital markets and becoming more
dependent on the Soviet Union than ever before.
The situation worsened in the late 1980s as
opportunities to grow through marshaling greater
resources began to dwindle and as relations began
to deteriorate with the principal socialist patron,
Gorbachev’s Soviet Union. This forced Pyongyang to
become more dependent on other socialist countries
for support. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the
subsequent breakup of the Eastern bloc was a major
macroeconomic shock that ushered in a period of as
yet unchecked decline.136
89

One of the most telling paradoxes of North
Korea’s political economy during the Cold War is the
extent to which Pyongyang successfully managed to
have its juche (self-reliance) cake and eat it too. As
an appealing legitimating principle, juche often has
been turned on its head to conceal a high degree of
dependence on Soviet and Chinese aid. Between 1948
and 1984, Moscow and Beijing were Pyongyang’s first
and second most important patrons, supplying $2.2
billion and $900 million in aid, respectively.137 Thanks
to the East-West and Sino-Soviet rivalries during the
Cold War, Pyongyang was allowed to practice such
concealed mendicant diplomacy. The collapse of the
Soviet Union was the most serious shock to socialist
North Korea, not only for the cessation of aid and the
virtual demise of concessional trade (dropping from
56.3 percent in 1990 to 5.3 percent in 2000), but also
because it delivered a wrenching blow to the muchtrumpeted juche-based national identity.
North Korea’s economic collapse in the 1990s was
the inevitable result of Pyongyang’s massive expenditures on military preparedness and the demise of Soviet
aid and trade. In a contradictory yet revealing manner,
Pyongyang admitted as much when it attributed the
failure of the Third Seven-Year Plan (1987 to 1993)
to a series of adverse external shocks: the “collusion
between the imperialists and counter-revolutionary
forces” and the “penetration of imperialist ideology
and culture” that had accelerated the demise of the
Second (Socialist) World and the end of Soviet aid.138 As
much as Pyongyang may blame the economic crisis on
such external shocks or on natural disaster at home, the
root causes of the economic crisis are deeply systemic.
The adverse external circumstances in the early 1990s
and the bad weather in 1995 and 1996 served only as
triggering and exacerbating factors.
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The political economy of post–Kim Il Sung North
Korea finds itself in a vicious circle: a successful export
strategy is not possible without massive imports of
high-tech equipment and plants, which in turn would
not be possible without hard-currency credits, which
in turn would not be possible without first paying off
its foreign debts through a successful export strategy,
and so on. The defining features of North Korea’s
external economic relations in the post–Cold War era
include: (1) the extreme degree to which markets were
repressed, with the resulting shrinkage of foreign
trade; (2) a chronic trade deficit; (3) a lack of access
to international capital markets due to the 1975 debt
default; and (4) a highly unusual balance-of-payments
profile that must be financed in highly unconventional
ways.139
As shown in Tables 6 and 7, Northeast Asia figures
most prominently in North Korea’s foreign trade, with
China (40 percent), South Korea (26 percent), Russia
(6 percent), and Japan (4.8 percent), in that order,
accounting for more than 77 percent of Pyongyang’s
total global trade in 2005. The first 5 years of the new
millennium (2001–05) have brought about significant
changes in the pattern and volume of North Korea’s
foreign trade. While total volume increased by 52
percent (from $2.67 billion in 2001 to $4.0 billion in
2005), China’s and South Korea’s shares increased
by 114 percent (from $737.5 million to $1,580 million)
and 162 percent (from $403 million to $1,055 million),
respectively. Japan’s share declined from 17.8 percent
to 4.8 percent ($475 million to $195 million), while
Russia’s share increased from 2.6 percent to 6.0 percent
($68.3 million to $213.4 million).
Seen in this light, Chinese-style reform and opening
are widely believed to be the most promising way out
of the poverty trap. Post-Mao China’s record doubling
of per capita output in the shortest period (1977-87)140
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Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

Export
Import
Total
Growth
Volume Growth
Volume Growth
Rate (%)
Rate (%) Volume Rate (%)
1,733
2,437
4,170
945
-45.5
1,639
-32.7
2,584
-38.0
933
-1.3
1,622
-1.0
2,555
-1.1
990
6.1
1,656
2.1
2,646
3.6
858
-13.3
1,242
-25.0
2,100
-20.6
736
-14.2
1,316
6.0
2,052
-2.3
726
-1.4
1,250
-5.0
1,976
-3.7
904
24.5
1,272
1.8
2,177
10.2
559
-38.2
883
-30.6
1,442
-33.8
515
-7.9
965
9.3
1,480
2.6
556
8.0
1,413
46.4
1,970
33.1
650
16.9
1,620
14.6
2,270
15.2
735
13.1
1,525
-5.9
2,260
-0.4
777
5.7
1,614
5.8
2,391
5.8
1,020
31.3
1,837
13.8
2,857
19.5
3,000
5.0

Sources: ROK Ministry of Unification and Korean Trade
Association (KOTRA).

Table 6. North Korea’s Foreign Trade
(Excluding North-South Trade), 1990-2005
(Unit: U.S.$ million).
2001
2002
2003
Country Trade Share Trade Share Trade Share
Volume (%) Volume (%) Volume (%)
China
737.5 27.6% 738.0 25.4% 1,022.9 32.8%
South
403.0
15.1% 641.7 22.1% 724.2 23.2%
Korea
Thailand
130 4.9% 216.6 7.5% 254.3 8.2%
Japan
474.7 17.8% 369.5 12.7% 265.3 8.5%
Russia
68.3 2.6%
80.7 2.8% 118.4 3.8%
India
157.8 5.9% 191.7 6.6% 158.4 5.1%
Others
702.1 26.3% 663.9 22.9% 572.0 18.4%
Total
2,673.5 100% 2,902.1 100% 3,115.5 100%

2004
2005
Trade Share Trade Share
Volume (%) Volume (%)
1,385.2 39.0% 1,580.3 39.0%
697.0 19.6% 1,055 26.0%
329.9 9.3%
329 8.1%
252.6 7.1%
195 4.8%
213.4 6.0%
232 5.7%
135.0 3.8%
541.0 15.2%
3,554.1 100% 4,055 100%

Sources: KOTRA and ROK Ministry of Unification.

Table 7. North Korea’s Top Trading Partners
(Including North-South Trade)
(Unit: U.S.$ million).
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should serve as inspiration to North Korea to follow
this path. Yet Pyongyang has issued mixed and
contradictory signals and statements about post-Mao
Chinese socialism. In six informal summit meetings
between 1978 and 1991, Deng Xiaoping repeatedly
urged Kim Il Sung to develop the economy through
reform and opening. This only provoked Kim Il Sung’s
testy retort, “We opened, already,” in reference to the
Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone.141 In
September 1993, however, Kim Il Sung reportedly told
a visiting Chinese delegation that he admired China
“for having achieved brilliant reforms and openness”
while continuing to build “socialism with Chinese
characteristics.” He also stated that the Chinese
experience would become “an encouraging factor for
us Koreans.”142 In a May 1999 meeting with Chinese
Ambassador Wan Yongxiang in Pyongyang, Kim Jong
II is reported to have said that he supported Chinesestyle reforms. In return, he asked Beijing to respect
“Korean-style socialism.”143
The North Korean government admitted in January
2001 the need for “new thinking” to adjust ideological
perspectives and work ethics to promote the “state
competitiveness” required in the new century.144 This
admission was accompanied by Kim Jong Il’s second
“secret” visit to Shanghai in less than 8 months (January
15–20, 2001) for an extensive personal inspection of
“capitalism with Shanghai characteristics.” These
developments prompted a flurry of wild speculation
about juche being Shanghaied and North Korea
becoming a “second China.”
Despite North Korea’s seeming determination to
undertake economic reform and the popular perception
that Chinese-style reform and opening are the most
promising way, there are at least five major obstacles.
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First, China’s reform and opening came about during
the heyday of the revived Cold War when anti-Soviet
China enjoyed and exercised its maximum realpolitik
leverage, as was made evident, for instance, in Beijing’s
easy entry into the World Bank and IMF in May 1980.
Second, China’s economic reforms were tied to a
political changing of the guard: the ascendancy of Deng
Xiaoping as the new paramount leader in December
1978 with the purging of the Gang of Four and Mao’s
designated heir-apparent Huo Guofeng. Despite much
speculation to the contrary, Kim Jong Il seems firmly
positioned to remain in power and even to name his
successor in the Kim dynasty. Third, unlike post-Mao
China, North Korea does not have rich, famous, and
enterprising overseas Koreans to generate the level of
foreign direct investment that China attracted in the
1980s. Fourth, the agriculture-led reform process we
have seen in East Asian transitional economies simply
may not be available to North Korea, due to the very
different initial conditions that resemble East European
economies or the former Soviet Union more than China
or Vietnam.
The fifth obstacle has to do with Pyongyang’s
Catch-22 identity dilemma. To save the juche system
would require destroying important parts of it and
also would require considerable opening to and help
from its capitalist southern rival. Yet to depart from
the ideological continuity of the system that the Great
Leader Kim Il Sung (“the father of the nation”) created,
developed, and passed onto the son is viewed not as a
survival necessity but as an ultimate betrayal of raison
d’état.
Nonetheless, there has been some evidence of North
Korea’s movement toward a system reform strategy.
In 1991 the DPRK established the Rajin-Sonbong Free
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Economic and Trade Zone, which has since become
the Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic Zone.145 Pyongyang
also agreed to participate in the TRADP, and recently
created the Sinuiju Special Autonomous Region (SAR)
on the Chinese border and also the Kaesong Industrial
Complex for cooperating with South Korea. Between
1992 and 2000, the DPRK wrote 47 new laws on foreign
investment, and a September 1998 constitutional
revision mentions “private property,” “material
incentives,” and “cost, price, and profit” in a document
that otherwise reads like an orthodox manifestation
of the DPRK’s juche philosophy.146 During his visit to
Shanghai in January 2001, Kim Jong Il highly praised
the Chinese developmental model of reform and
opening (with Shanghai characteristics).
On July 1, 2002, North Korea enacted a set of
major economic reform measures—known as “7.1
Measures”—with the main emphasis on marketization,
monetarization, decentralization, and acquisition of
FDI. Specifically, the DPRK adjusted its system of
controlled prices, devalued the won, raised wages,
adjusted the rationing system, opened a “socialist
goods trading market,” gave farmers a type of property
right regarding the cultivation of particular parcels of
land, and extended laws for special economic zones.147
More recently, against the backdrop of growing
containment and encirclement sanctions by Washington and Tokyo, Pyongyang has found a new pair
of patrons in South Korea and China, beefing up its
system-reforming developmental strategy with North
Korean characteristics. South Korea surged ahead of
Japan as North Korea’s second largest trade partner in
2002 and inter-Korean trade hit an all-time high of over
$1 billion in 2005. South Korea’s aid in various forms
(rice, fertilizer, tourism, and direct investment in the
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Kaesong Industrial Complex) is now estimated to be
about $1 billion, which is six times the level of 2000.148
Kim Jong Il’s fourth state visit to China from
January 10 to 18, 2006, coming on the heels of President
Hu Jintao’s state visit to North Korea in October 2005,
culminated a series of regular bilateral exchanges of
visitations and interactions between Chairman Kim
Jong Il and top Chinese leaders since 2000. These
exchanges emphasized their shared concerns and
determination to reconstruct and renormalize the
relationship on a more solid and stable footing. Even
though this was an unofficial (secret) state visit, Kim
Jong Il received the red carpet treatment. All nine
members of the Politburo Standing Committee of
the Chinese Communist Party, the most powerful
political organ of the Chinese system, were mobilized
to welcome Kim Jong Il in a manner on par with the
greeting a U.S. president would get. In effect, Beijing
was showcasing to the outside world, especially the
United States, its commitment to underwriting near
abroad (North Korean) stability in order to safeguard
the conditions for establishing a well-off society at
home.
By shifting gears from aid to a deeper system of
trade and investment, China also is coaxing North
Korea to follow the post-Mao Chinese style of reform
and opening. In a short span of 5 years, China’s trade
with North Korea jumped by a factor of 3.2, from
$488 million in 2001 to $1.58 billion in 2005. Over 120
Chinese companies are reported to have moved to
North Korea to engage in joint ventures in a bicycle
factory, in the coal and natural resources sectors, and
in plans to build transportation networks, including a
new highway from Hunchun to Rajin.
As if to demonstrate a tit-for-tat cooperative strategy, Kim Jong Il and his entourage (with no military
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officers) visited six Chinese cities (Guangzhou,
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Wuhan, Yichang, and Beijing) in
8 days, with a heavy emphasis on visits to industrial,
agricultural, and educational facilities. For the record,
and in terms warmer than during previous visits,
Kim Jong Il is reported to have “provided expressive
compliments to his hosts on the economic progress
accomplished over little short of three decades” and
declared that he had “trouble sleeping at night” during
his visit because he was “pondering how to apply
reforms to North Korea to generate the results he
witnessed in Guangzhou.” In his official toast offering
thanks to Hu Jintao for arranging the visit, Kim said
that he was “deeply impressed” by China’s “shining
achievements” and “exuberant development,”
especially China’s high-tech sector.149
In the final analysis, any successful medium- and
long-term coping strategy must be systemic, involving
the institutional design and implementation of measures that are consistent and congruent across different
and traditionally disparate areas of policymaking and
also between domestic and foreign policies. While
piecemeal tactical adaptations can yield some
concessions and payoffs in the short run, a series of
system reform measures pursued swiftly would yield
both greater benefits and, perhaps, greater dangers.
CONCLUSIONS
There is something very old and very new in postCold War foreign relations of the DPRK, affirming the
old saying, “The more things change, the more they
remain the same.” As in the Cold-War era, the centrality
of the Big Four in North Korea’s foreign policy thinking
and behavior has remained unchanged. Indeed, the
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Big Four serve as the most sensitive barometer of the
general orientation of North Korean foreign relations
as a whole. To be sure, since 2000 North Korea has
launched diplomatic outreach, establishing official
relations with most EU member states, plus such other
countries as Australia, Brazil, Canada, and Turkey.
Pyongyang also became a member of the Asean
Regional Forum (ARF) in 2002, gaining a political
foothold in Southeast Asia. But few of these efforts
have moved much beyond diplomatic formalities, and
few really have concentrated the minds of key foreign
policymakers in Pyongyang.
Despite or perhaps even because of the greatpower centrality, North Korea’s relations with the Big
Four Plus One changed dramatically in the post-Cold
War era, especially since 2000. What is most striking
about post-Cold War North Korean foreign policy is
not the centrality of the Big Four but rather the extent
to which the United States has functioned as a kind
of force-multiplier for catalyzing some major changes
and shifts in Pyongyang’s international approach
to affairs. North Korea has sought and found a new
troika of life-supporting geopolitical patrons in China,
South Korea, and Russia and also a new pair of lifesupporting geo-economic patrons in China and South
Korea, even as the dominant perception of the United
States has shifted significantly from an indispensable
life-support system to a mortal threat.
As if to nod to the DPRK’s “tyranny of proximity,”
however, all three of North Korea’s contiguous
neighbors—China, Russia, and South Korea—
strongly oppose what these countries perceive to be
Washington’s goal of regime change. For example,
the Bush administration’s original plan of forming
broadest possible NEA united front against the DPRK
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on the nuclear issue eventually was turned on its head
by Beijing’s mediation diplomacy at the second session
of the fourth round of Six Party talks, culminating in
the September 19, 2005, Joint Statement of Principles—
the first-ever successful outcome of the on-again,
off-again multilateral dialogue of more than 2 years.
China successfully mobilized “the coalition of the
willing” in support of its fifth and final draft of the Joint
Statement—especially on the provision of a peaceful
nuclear program (light-water reactor)—with three in
favor (China, South Korea, Russia), one opposed (the
United States), and one abstaining or split in its position
between the two (Japan), creating an 3 1/2 and 1 1/2
vote against the U.S. position.
China, South Korea, and Russia favor North
Korea’s proposal of a step-by-step denuclearization
process based on simultaneous and reciprocal (“words
for words” and “action for action”) concessions.150
By contrast, the Bush administration’s CVID formula
would require North Korea to reveal and permit “the
publicly disclosed and observable disablement of
all nuclear weapons/weapons components and key
centrifuge parts” before the United States indicates what
incentives would be offered in return. With the situation
in Iraq continuing to be a major challenge, the United
States cannot afford an armed conflict in Northeast
Asia, and this fact alone increases both North Korean
and Chinese bargaining leverage in trying to chart a
nonviolent course through the Six Party process.
Beijing’s commitment to underwrite gradual reform of North Korea as a cost-effective means of averting its collapse as well as establishing a harmonious and
well-off society (xiaokang shehui) at home was brought
into sharp relief during Kim Jong Il’s fourth trip to
China. Expanded life and reform support for North
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Korea through direct assistance, a growing trade and
investment relationship, and a trade deficit that serves
as de facto aid were signs of China’s determination to
beef up a series of major economic reform measures
initiated in the second half of 2002 rather than risk
system collapse or regime change by the Bush
administration. Kim Jong Il’s visit also suggests that
ties between the two socialist allies are becoming ever
closer, both politically and economically, in tandem
with the rapid deterioration of Pyongyang’s relations
with Washington and Tokyo. Adept at playing great
powers off against each other, Kim Jong Il will no
doubt use Chinese support to stimulate more aid
without becoming too dependent on South Korea and
as a powerful counterweight to the United States and
Japan.
One thing that the collapsist school failed to realize
is that Kim Il Sung’s death actually may have created
a more stable DPRK. Kim Jong Il’s North Korea differs
from that of his father, when the dream of unification
involved the absorption of, not by, South Korea.
As Georgy Bulychev suggests, “Kim Jong Il . . . is
neither Nero nor Louis XIV—he thinks about ‘après
moi’ and wants to keep the state in place, but he also
understands that it is impossible to do this without
change.”151 In this context, a change in the regime’s
strategic paradigm, rather than a change of the regime
itself, looks more and more like the proper resolution
to the broad concerns about North Korea’s future.152
As it is easy to say with Korea—and particularly
with anything involving North Korea—the future of
North Korea’s relations with the Big Four Plus One
is unclear. Indeed, it seems more unclear now than
it did in the early to mid 1990s when a broad swath
of academics and policy analysts was predicting the

100

imminent collapse of the North Korean regime and
the reunification of Korea. The interplay between
North Korea and the outside world is highly complex,
variegated, and even confusing. What complicates our
understanding of the shape of things to come in North
Korea’s foreign relations is that all countries involved
have become moving targets on turbulent trajectories
subject to competing and often contradictory pressures
and forces.
That said, however, the way the outside world—
especially the Big Four plus Seoul—responds to
Pyongyang is keyed closely to the way North Korea
responds to the outside world. North Korea’s
future is malleable rather than predetermined. This
nondeterministic image of the future of the post–Kim
Il Sung system opens up room for the outside world
to use whatever leverage it might have to help North
Korean leaders opt for one future scenario or another
in the coming years.
A cornered and insecure North Korea is an
unpredictable and even dangerous North Korea that
may feel compelled to launch a preemptive strike,
igniting a major armed conflagration in the Korean
peninsula and beyond. For geopolitical, geo-economic,
and other reasons, Beijing, Moscow, Seoul, and even
Tokyo would be happier to see the peaceful coexistence
of the two Korean states on the Korean peninsula than
to cope with the turmoil, chaos, and probable massive
exodus of refugees that system collapse would generate
in its wake.
Despite the gloomy prospects for near-term
movement on the negotiating front in Beijing, the
Six Party process offers an opportunity to produce
something larger than mere resolution of the specific
issue of North Korea’s nuclear program. Not only is
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regional and global multilateralism now an integral
part of security thinking in Beijing, Moscow, Seoul, and
Tokyo, it also is a useful instrument for the much
needed conflict management mechanisms in Northeast
Asia. Therefore we should seize the twin historical
opportunities of China’s rising multilateralism and
the Six Party process in the interests of forming and
institutionalizing a truly Northeast Asian security
regime. The Northeast Asian states need to expand
multilateral dialogue and economic integration in
the interests of building order and solving problems.
The U.S.-DPRK standoff risks derailing burgeoning
Northeast Asian regionalism, yet it is this very
regionalism that will help prevent future spirals like
that characterizing both nuclear standoffs between the
United States and North Korea.
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